Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

3-14-2014

Towards Reengineering the United States
Department of Defense: A Financial Case for a
Functionally-Aligned, Unified Military Structure
Luke R. Stover

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Recommended Citation
Stover, Luke R., "Towards Reengineering the United States Department of Defense: A Financial Case for a Functionally-Aligned,
Unified Military Structure" (2014). Theses and Dissertations. 691.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/691

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

TOWARDS REENGINEERING THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: A
FINANCIAL CASE FOR A FUNCTIONALLYALIGNED, UNIFIED MILITARY
STRUCTURE
THESIS
Luke R. Stover, Captain, USAF
AFIT-ENS-14-M-30

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United
States Government.

AFIT-ENS-14-M-30

TOWARDS REENGINEERING THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE: A FINANCIAL CASE FOR A FUNCTIONALLY-ALIGNED, UNIFIED
MILITARY STRUCTURE

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty
Department of Operational Sciences
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics Management

Luke R. Stover, MA
Captain, USAF

March 2014

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

AFIT-ENS-14-M-30

TOWARDS REENGINEERING THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE: A FINANCIAL CASE FOR A FUNCTIONALLY-ALIGNED, UNIFIED
MILITARY STRUCTURE

Luke R. Stover, MA
Captain, USAF

Approved:

//signed//
____________________________________
Joseph R. Huscroft, Lt Col, USAF (Chairman)
//signed//
____________________________________
Dr. Alan W. Johnson (Member)
//signed//
____________________________________
Dr. Alan R. Heminger (Member)

___
date

___
date

___
date

AFIT-ENS-14-M-30

Abstract

This research examined the potential financial and non-financial benefits of
working towards reengineering the Department of Defense (DoD) through the adaptation
of a functionally-aligned, unified organizational structure. Based on historical analysis of
the DoD’s current structure, a proposed DoD structure is presented that aligns operational
functions under functional corps and support functions under existing defense-wide
agencies and field activities. An analysis of overlapping functionality between services
provided the basis for quantitative analysis of size-of-force and budget request data for
Fiscal Year 2013 (FY2013). This analysis enabled the comparison of operational
efficiency between services. These rates were used to benchmark operational efficiency
across the DoD. An estimate of savings for each function was assessed by comparing the
actual budget request for FY2013 against the estimated budget request under the
proposed structure. Through sensitivity analysis, estimated savings from these functional
areas ranged between $7 Billion and $100 Billion for FY2013. Analysis of existing
literature highlighted non-financial implications of adopting a functionally-aligned,
unified DoD structure. Recommendations for future research include the need for an
Activity-Based Costing and Budgeting system to identify actual costs of DoD functions.
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TOWARDS REENGINEERING THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE: A FINANCIAL CASE FOR A FUNCTIONALLY-ALIGNED, UNIFIED
MILITARY STRUCTURE
I. Introduction

Background
The United States Government (USG) currently faces a fiscally-unbalanced
environment. In the 15 seconds it took to type this sentence, the federal debt grew
another $400,000 USD (US National Debt Clock). Representing approximately 17
percent of the USG’s $3.8 Trillion USD in outlays for fiscal year (FY) 2014, the
Department of Defense (DoD) can either be part of the budgetary problem or contribute
to the fiscal solution (National Priorities Project). Recently, the inability of Congress to
pass a deliberate budget resulted in the implementation of sequestration measures. These
measures indiscriminately cut 10 percent from most USG departments, to include the
DoD. Sequestration seeks to reduce spending across USG programs, regardless of the
program’s operating efficiency. Essentially, sequestration is a stop-gap measure to
temporarily address symptoms of an inefficient system. However, as Michael Hammer
and James Champy explain in their book, Reengineering the Corporation, to affect
lasting change, organizations must fundamentally rethink business operations; they must
reengineer processes (Hammer & Champy, 1993).
The need to reengineer the current DoD structure, and the processes inherent
within, goes beyond fiscal considerations. The USG budgetary situation is a real and
present threat to America’s national security. The ability of the DoD to maintain an
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effective force, capable of executing the National Security Strategy, is contingent upon a
federal budget that resources all required military functions. According to the DoD’s FY
2013 Budget Proposal, these requirements resulted in a defense budget request of $526.2
Billion USD. This budget request is an assemblage of inputs through the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) process by which military
services identify requirements, which military departments translate into budget requests
that are consolidated and submitted by the DoD.
Currently, the DoD is aligned by departments: Army, Navy, and Air Force; and
services: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. These services are resourced to
organize, train, and equip forces to provide certain functional capability to combatant
commanders (Figure 1, DoD Organizational Structure).

Figure 1. DoD Organizational Structure (Organization and Management Planning)
2

Title 10, US Code, defines the role of the military by department and service.
DoD Directive (DODD) 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major
Components, provides amplifying guidance on the functions of military departments and
services. To be clear, although the terms role, mission, function, and process are often
used interchangeably, the terms are not synonymous. The term role is defined by the
2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) Report as:
Role: The broad and enduring purposes for which the Services…were established
by law. (QRM Report, 2009:4)
Additionally, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, defines mission and function as follows:
Mission: The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to
be taken and the reason therefore. (Joint Publication 1-02, 2010:183)
Function: The broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is
designed, equipped, and trained. (Joint Publication 1-02, 2010:115)
Hammer & Champy define process as follows:
Process: A collection of activities that takes one or more kinds of input and
creates an output that is of value to the customer. (Hammer & Champy, 1993: 38)
The distinction between processes and functions, especially with regard to
reengineering, is an important one. The fundamental difference is one of customer focus.
This distinction will be discussed in greater detail at the end of Chapter 2.
A synopsis of department and service functions, as defined in DODD 5100.01, is
attached in Appendix 1. This synopsis highlights the degree of functional overlap
between military components. Of note, this functional overlap exists in spite of DoD
direction for Secretaries of the Military Departments to:
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Coordinate with the other Military Departments and all of the other DoD
Components to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical
administration; eliminate duplication; and assist other DoD Components in the
accomplishment of their respective functions…(Emphasis Added) (DODD
5100.01, Enclosure 6, 2010; 26)
To eliminate duplication, functions must be clearly defined and apportioned
between services. In an organization as big and complex as the DoD, this becomes
extremely challenging. One approach to reducing duplication is through military service
unification.
Current DoD attempts at service unification focus on joint-basing initiatives at the
tactical and operational level and unified combatant commands at the strategic level.
Joint basing efforts pair bases from different services that are geographically proximate
and consolidates base-level support functions. In addition to joint basing, under the
purview of the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the DoD operates three functional
combatant commands: US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), US Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM), and US Special Forces Command (USSOCOM) and six
geographic combatant commands: US Pacific Command (USPACOM), US European
Command (USEUCOM), US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), US Central
Command (USCENTCOM), US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and US Africa
Command (USAFRICOM). However, the DoD does not organize, train, nor equip forces
to perform functions jointly; they simply execute functional missions under a joint
purview.
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Problem Statement
The current service-based DoD structure is functionally redundant and fiscally
inefficient. Working towards reengineering the DoD, by adopting a functionally-aligned
structure, may reduce the DoD’s fiscal footprint.

Research Objectives/Investigative Questions
The objective of this research is to assess the potential fiscal savings of the DoD
reengineering towards a functionally-aligned, unified structure. To accomplish this, a
thorough evaluation of the current DoD budget request is required. This assessment must
examine which functions each military service provides to combatant commanders and at
what price. Special consideration shall be given to areas of overlapping functionality.
Understanding the current structure provides a springboard by which to examine
alternative structural designs. In this vein, the research gives consideration to countries
that have adopted a unified, functionally-aligned military structure in addition to
proposed models for the US DoD. Finally, given a modified military structure, this study
assesses non-financial benefits that the DoD might realize, should it reengineer. To
address the objective of this thesis, three investigative questions (IQ) are posed:
IQ 1. What functional areas overlap between military services?
IQ 2. Could the DoD reduce its budget requests by adopting a functionallyaligned, unified structure?
IQ 3. What are the non-financial implications of a functionally-aligned, unified
structure?

Research Focus
This research primarily examines current and proposed DoD organizational
structures from a fiscal perspective. The impetus for this research stems from the current
5

USG fiscal challenges. As highlighted in Chapter 2, most research on the topic of
implementing a functionally-aligned unified military is theoretical, arguing the perceived
merits and concerns of reorganizing the current DoD structure. Very little quantitative
research exists on the fiscal savings of such a reorganizational effort. The complexity
and immensity of the current DoD structure and budget request process, issues that will
be addressed separately in following chapters, limits the scope of this research to a
macro-level focus. This study does not analyze every role, mission, and function
performed by the DoD. Nor does it account for every dollar the DoD spends, or requests,
in each fiscal year. Instead, this research examines the core functions of military
departments and services and the budget requests to provide these functions. The study
focuses on the DoD’s Budget Request for one fiscal year, FY2013. The organizational
changes proposed in this study are not intended as detailed blueprints for DoD
reengineering. Instead, the research should be viewed as an azimuth by which future
discussions, research, and decisions might be based.

Methodology
This research is supported by three legs: 1) Qualitative content analysis of
overlapping functions by military service and non-financial benefits of a functionallyaligned force structure 2) Quantitative assessment of the size of force provided by
function, by service and 3) Quantitative analysis of budget requests associated with each
function, by service. Content analysis of Title 10 USC, DODD 5100.01, other joint
publications, and related academic literature provides a framework of overlapping
military service functions. Content analysis of existing literature provides a register of
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non-financial benefits to reengineering the DoD under a unified, functionally-aligned
organizational structure. Quantitative size-of-force data is collected from service budget
justification books, service and joint factsheets, and related academic literature.
Quantitative budget data is collected from the DoD’s FY2013 Budget Request. By
comparing budget requests per function by service, in like size-of-force units, the
research identifies the lowest budget request by function between services. This baseline
per-function figure is benchmarked across all services to form a baseline fiscal savings
figure over the current DoD structure.

Assumptions/Limitations
The vast extent of this research inherently increases the number and scope of
assumptions made. First, it is assumed that the data provided within the FY13 DoD
Budget Proposal is accurate and representative of actual resource expenditures. Second,
without a sole source document on size-of-force data, it is assumed that the
conglomerated data accurately represents the current force. Third, in analyzing military
structures from other countries, it is assumed that a similar structure could be scaled up to
the US DoD. Fourth, the non-financial benefits presented in response to IQ 3 are feasible
and valid. Finally, and perhaps must fundamentally, it is assumed that the methodology
for this research will provide meaningful estimates of potential fiscal savings. In theory,
comparing average price per unit of function provided is a valid approach to assessing
fiscal savings, in practice; fiscal savings may be elusive in an organization as vast as the
DoD.
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Likewise, the scope of the research problem yields several limitations. First, the
link between the functions provided by military services and the budget requests
associated with those functions is not always clear. While the DoD utilizes Budget
Activity Codes (BAC) to appropriate funds to specific functions, these codes vary by
service for the same function. The accuracy of the analysis is limited to by the correct
interpretation of BACs and the functions they represent. Second, this study is limited in
scope to macro-level core service functions and associated budget requests. The fiscal
savings presented represent an order of magnitude estimate, not precise financial figures.
Finally, the research does not address the political, social, and cultural issues that would
inherently arise from such a dramatic change from the current DoD structure.

Implications
This research will open lines of dialogue for discussing the roles, missions,
functions, and processes of the DoD’s military services. Additionally, this research will
highlight areas of overlapping functionality within the DoD. This overlapping
functionality drives associated budget requests. By analyzing these budget requests and
proposing a revised DoD organizational structure to reduce them, the study may allow the
DoD to realize significant fiscal savings in the long run. These long run fiscal savings
may provide options to DoD leaders that desire to move beyond addressing the symptoms
of an inefficient system to reengineering the system itself.

Summary
Sequestration, civilian furloughs, and potential diminishing force capabilities are
symptoms of an inefficient DoD structure in a fiscally-constrained USG environment.
8

This study addresses the current service-based DoD structure, which is functionally
redundant and fiscally inefficient. Working towards reengineering through adopting a
functionally-aligned, unified organization, may reduce the DoD’s fiscal footprint. The
Literature Review in the next chapter provides a historical perspective on the current
DoD structure, assesses current literature relating to functionally-aligned unified military
structures, and discusses the concept of reengineering and its application to the DoD.
Chapter 3 details the methodology by which the functions, size of force, and budget data
from different services merge to form a comprehensive fiscal analysis of the current DoD
structure. Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis as they relate to the three IQs.
Finally, conclusions from analysis of the results are presented, to include
recommendations for future research and use within the DoD.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
A review of existing literature on the topic is structured in three sections. First, a
review of the history behind the current DoD organizational structure to include the US
Constitution, the National Security Act of 1947, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
Second, an appraisal of current unified force structures in use by other countries and an
examination of proposed models for the DoD. Finally, a review of methodologies used to
estimate the effectiveness of organizational reengineering.

History
Constitution of the United States
On July 4, 1776, the First Continental Congress approved final edits to a
document that shaped history as few documents have done before or since. The
Declaration of Independence, although not signed by members of Congress until August
2, 1776, was born that day; and with it, radical ideas on freedom, liberty, and democracy
that have since shaped the world (The Charters of Freedom). The Declaration was a line
in the proverbial sand of English tyrannical rule. It summarized “self-evident truths” by
presenting before the world a list of grievances against the King. It was the impetus for a
war of independence and the guiding light that led a fledgling country to freedom. 11
years later, a second, equally important, but fundamentally different, document was
penned by members of the Constitutional Convention—the Constitution of the United
States. The Declaration of Independence was, in the terminology of Hammer & Champy,
a “case for action.” It defined where the country stood and why it could no longer remain
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there. The Constitution was a “vision document,” detailing what the country must
become. (Hammer & Champy, 1993).
Adopted on September 17, 1787, the Constitution was eventually ratified by
conventions in eleven states before taking effect on March 4, 1789 (The Charters of
Freedom, 2013). The primary objective of the document was to clearly define the role of
the central government in the affairs of states and in the lives of individual citizens. The
Constitution, as with most important documents, was written out of necessity. If the
United States was to become a truly unified country, it required a firm foundation on
which to build a “more perfect union.” Of primary importance to this research is Article
One, Section Eight: Powers of Congress.
Under Section Eight, the powers enumerated to congress are established. These
powers include several pertaining to the establishment and organization of a military.
Specifically:
The Congress shall have power …
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be
for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and
the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress; (Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8)
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Understanding the need for a “common defence,” Congress retained the power to
form an Army and a Navy. Congress also understood the need to organize military forces
in such a way that they might be effectively employed in service to the United States.
The organization of the US Military, both at present, and over the past 226 years is rooted
in these articles. The first major organizational step for the US Military was the
establishment of the War Department.
While the Continental Army was formed in 1775, the War Department wasn’t
formally established until 1789 (Keskel, 2002). In 1798, in response to the advancement
of naval capability in the late 18th century, Congress established the Department of the
Navy. Keskel points to this act, the creation of separate military departments with
Presidential-appointed, cabinet-level, positions to oversee different functional military
operations, as the birth of service parochialism (Keskel, 2002).
After the American Civil War, President Grant made an ill-fated attempt at reorganizing the War and Navy Departments. As a war fighter, Grant recognizing the need
for clarity of command, and proposed legislation to provide such. Politically, the idea
was not salient and little change resulted (Leffler & Ward, 1992).
The outcome of the Spanish-American War was marred by the inability of the
Army and Navy to work together. In response, President McKinley appointed a
commission to investigate the root causes. The commission recommended the creation of
the general staff of the Army and the Navy. However, these staffs proved to be largely
ineffective because neither had the power to influence the efforts of the other.
Nevertheless, this structure remained in place for nearly 50 years (Leffler & Ward, 1992).
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In reflection upon the fateful events of December 7, 1941, President Truman
remarked:
The tragedy was as much the result of the inadequate military system which
provided for no unified military command, either in the field or in Washington, as
it was any personal failure of the Army or Navy commander. (Truman, 1956: 46)
Though ultimately successful, America’s efforts in World War II were severally
hampered by combat operations in two major theaters, led by strong military leaders in
both services, competing for scarce resources. As the war progressed, the friction created
by competition for resources under a disjointed command structure mounted. This
friction was especially strong in the Pacific Theater under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz (Leffler & Ward, 1992). Their interservice competition threatened to undermine the entire war effort. President Truman
noted:
We must never fight another war the way that we fought the last two. I have the
feeling that if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought
each other, the war would have ended much earlier. (Congressional Research
Services, 2013: 3)
Eventually, a unified command structure emerged in the European Theater under
the command of General Eisenhower. However, no such unity was ever achieved in the
Pacific (Leffler & Ward, 1992). At the close of the war, in an attempt to formalize
command structures in future wars, President Truman argued for the creation of a unified
defense department, citing excessive military spending and inter-service rivalry (Hogan,
2000). The concept of “unity of command,” was adopted under the Outline Command
Plan of 1946 (Congressional Research Services, 2013). This plan outlined seven separate
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and distinct geographic commands and was the framework for the DoD’s current UCP.
The next year, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947.
National Security Act of 1947
Signed into law on July 26, 1947, the National Security Act of 1947 contained
sweeping defense reform. The major impacts of the act were the creation of: the
National Military Establishment (NME); the U.S. Air Force as a separate, but equal,
military service; the Department of The Air Force as a separate, but equal, military
department; the office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); and the Unified
Combatant Command (UCC) structure. The UCC essentially established a single
commander who would have direct command authority over all forces (land, sea, or air)
assigned to his theater under a unified command (CRS, 2013). These unified commands
would be established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) subject to approval by the
President and the Secretary of Defense.
The National Security Act of 1947 gave legal standing for the Secretary of
Defense to command and the JCS to conduct joint strategic planning for all U.S. military
forces. At the urging of the first SECDEF, James Forrestal, the act was amended in 1949
to solidify the subordination of all services to the NME (Quinn, 1993). To emphasize
this point, the amendment changed the name of the NME to the DoD, emphasizing the
department’s executive power. A contributing factor to these amendments was the Key
West and Newport Agreements of 1948. The Newport Agreement clarified the term
“primary mission,” which in later years was used to delineate the different functions of
each military service (Eilon & Lyon, 2010). The Key West Agreement, among other
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things, attempted to resolve the debate over the responsibilities of each service (Keskel,
2002). The agreements ended in further compromise with results that were:
…ambiguous in service roles, and redundancy in service functions, which build
higher costs into the very heart of the US defense establishment. (Blechman,
1993: np)
Collectively, the Key West and Newport Agreements, along with the 1949
amendments to the National Security Act provided the backbone for DoDD 5100.1 (Eilon
& Lyon, 2010). The evolution of DoDD 5100.1 (now DoDD 5100.01) coincides with
major reorganization efforts of the DoD as depicted in Figure 2. Historical Changes to
DoDD 5100.1.

Figure 2. Historical Changes to DODD 5100.1 (Eilon & Lyon, 2010:32)

Following the Korean War, President Eisenhower pushed for further reform of the
DoD structure under the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The President articulated
the need for a more unified and streamlined chain of command and the need to
completely unite air, sea, and land combat forces. The means by which President
15

Eisenhower sought to accomplish such reform was by moving the JCS out from
underneath the Secretary of Defense in the operational chain of command and thorough
the establishment of unified or specified commands that were assigned specific functional
missions (Congressional Research Services, 2013). These two objectives were
synchronous:
Commanders of both the unified and specified commands now took their orders
directly on the authority of the President or the Secretary, and the CINCs were
delegated full 'operational command' over forces assigned to them. (Quinn, 1993:
72)
In the years following the Vietnam War, three incidents shaped the need for
further defense organization reform: Desert One—the failed rescue of Iranian hostage by
U.S. Special Forces in 1980, the bombing of the Marine battalion headquarters building
in Lebanon of 1983, and the problem-riddled invasion of Grenada, also in 1983 (Quinn,
1993). Collectively, these events highlighted the awkward and divided command
arrangements created through undue parochial service interests. Each of these incidents
seemed to result from a failure of joint command and control, from the overly balanced
apportionment of missions between services, or from a refusal by the services to
cooperate with one another within that chain (Quinn, 1993). According to a staff report
by the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1985, the causal factors of these events were
summarized as such:
Unity of command and the assignment of appropriately-skilled personnel to the
mission - and thus its chances for success - were perceived to have been sacrificed
in order to satisfy parochial service considerations. (Defense Organization, 1985:
86)
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Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
Defense organizational reform came in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986. The act sought to bring about a renewed emphasis on “jointness” in Congress and
within the DoD. According to former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations, James R. Locher III, the act sought to resolve nine major problems plaguing
the DoD (Locher, 2001).
First, there existed an imbalance between service and joint interests. Supported
by their respective JCS, the services yielded a great degree of power over the unified
commanders they were supposed to be supporting. Then Chairman of the JCS, General
David Jones, assembled a Chairman’s Special Study Group on this issue. The group’s
findings included:
The problem is one of balance. A certain amount of service independence is
healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial interests of the
services too much, and the larger needs of the nation’s defense too little.
(Chairman’s Special Study Group, 1982: 54)
Second, the JCS was not providing political leaders with the advisement they
required. Inter-service rivalry slowed or halted progress on key issues brought before the
JCS. When common ground could be found on such issues, the compromised solution
often diminished the value of information provided. Prior SECDEF, James Schlesinger,
offered a scathing criticism of the ineffectiveness of the JCS during this time period:
The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always
disregarded. (Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1983: 187)
Third, joint-duty was viewed as a career-killing assignment by many military
officers. Overbearing military services often kept very close tabs on “their” officers
assigned to joint staff assignments, limiting their effectiveness to operate under a joint
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purview. These officers were often more concerned with their exit strategy from the
joint staff then the job they were placed there to accomplish.
Fourth, operational chains of commands were confused and cumbersome.
Although the JCS did not fall within the operational chain of command (since the
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958) they often acted as if they did, adding undue and
unnecessary influence to the unified command process. Further, unified commanders
often faced what they called “the wall of the component,” where individual services held
the reigns of their forces assigned to unified commanders, essentially limiting the
effectiveness of those forces to carry out their missions. Political scientist Samuel
Huntington observed:
Each service continues to exercise great autonomy. … Unified commands are not
really commands, and they certainly aren’t unified. (Hunington, 1984: 24)
Fifth, strategic planning at the Pentagon was largely ineffective. With so much
attention focused on infighting between the JCS, unified commanders, and services, little
time or attention was left for long-range planning.
Sixth, numerous DoD-level agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had been created since the 1940s.
These agencies were designed to provide common support to all DoD components.
However, the agencies lacked the mechanisms and oversight required to control them and
effectively utilize their available resources.
Seventh, although the National Security Act of 1947 specified the role of the
SECDEF, the role of the service secretaries had never been clearly defined. Often
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viewed as a politically sensitive topic, the relationship between the SECDEF and the
service secretaries was largely unspecified.
Eighth, unnecessary duplication plagued the military department headquarters.
With separate staffs for the secretary and the service chief, each service was burdened
with redundancy.
Finally, there was at this time a problem with congressional micromanagement.
Perhaps, acting out of necessity because of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the
DoD to coordinate its internal actions, Congress found itself making tactical level
decisions that should have been made by the services. Senator Samuel Nunn, one of the
driving forces behind the Goldwater-Nichols Act commented:
Last year [1984], Congress changed the number of smoke grenade launchers and
muzzle boresights the Army requested. We directed the Navy to pare back its
request for parachute flares, practice bombs, and passenger vehicles. Congress
specified that the Air Force should cut its request for garbage trucks, street
cleaners, and scoop loaders. This is a bit ridiculous. (Congress, Senate, Senator
Nunn, 1985: 25350-4)
Signed into law on October 1, 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act enacted sweeping
changes across the DoD. According to Lindsay Eilon and Jack Lyon, authors of an OSD
white paper on the evolution of DoDD 5100.1, the changes fell into three broad
categories:
Empowered the CJCS—The Chairman became the principal military advisor to
the President and Secretary of Defense. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Staff were also placed under the Chairman’s exclusive
direction, and the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was
created. This considerably reduced the role and influence of the Service Chiefs.
(Eilon & Lyon, 2010: 20)
Empowered the Combatant Commands/ Commanders—Functions previously held
by the Military Services were transferred to them. (Eilon & Lyon, 2010: 20)
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Increased and improved jointness and efficiency among the Services—
The U.S. Military has been coordinating joint actions for centuries…the
Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to legislatively solidify and improve upon the most
successful practices for the conduct of joint operations in the future. (Eilon &
Lyon, 2010: 20, 23)
Present
In the years following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the US military
continues to struggle with merging operational forces from different services into a
coherent joint force. Perhaps the most striking example of the lack of service
interoperability was the shooting down of an Army Blackhawk helicopter by a US Air
Force F-15 during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1994 (Keskel, 2002).
Despite tragic events like the fratricide of 1994, defense organizational reform has made
little progress in the past two decades.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld attempted to introduce reorganizational
measures on the heels of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR):

Secretary Rumsfeld did make a valiant effort at transformation. On September 10,
2001, he laid out a major initiative to restructure the military. He announced an
effort to reduce headquarters staff by 15 percent and rid the Pentagon of
overlapping bureaucracy that he said was a serious threat, to the security of the
United States of America. Ironically, the very next day, on 11 September 2001,
terrorists attacked America by hijacking commercial airliners and crashing them
into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Suddenly, all the bickering and
debates vanished, and the nation was united in a new war on terrorism. (Keskel,
2002: viii)
Although organizational reform took a back seat to the Global War on Terrorism
in the days, weeks, and months following 11 September 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld
understood the critical importance of restructuring the DoD when he commented in a
memorandum dated 17 September 2002 that:
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The war on terrorism does not supplant the need to transform the DOD; instead,
we must accelerate our organizational, operational, business, and process reforms.
(Rumsfeld, 2002: np)
As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan waged on for the next decade,
defense reorganization received little attention. However, in the past two years the US
has withdrawn from Iraq and is planning the complete withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The DoD now faces force reductions commensurate with its reduced overseas
commitment. As the US attempts to reduce its fiscal footprint while still maintaining a
capable force, reorganization of the DoD is worthy of consideration. The following
section evaluates existing and proposed unified force structure models that may serve as a
jumping off point for DoD reorganization.

Unified Force Structure Models
Existing National Models – Canada
In 1968 Canada moved to a unified military construct to resolve overlapping
functionality issues at the strategic level (Milberry, 1984). Under this construct, military
components are functionally delineated under a unified command structure (Figure 3,
Canadian Unified Command Structure).
In his Army War College paper on the topic, Lieutenant Colonel George Boucher
states that Canada was the first major power to reform its military under a total
unification organizational structure (Boucher, 1975). Unification, in this case, involved
both the integration and merger of the three services and their activities. In 1963, a Royal
Commission noted the triplication of efforts between the Army, Navy, and Air Force in
areas such as recruiting, information, finance, and intelligence. The redundancy, along
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with a modern reliance on joint operations and unseemly rivalries between services,
provided the impetus for reform. The emphasis of the reform was on cost savings. As
Canada’s all-volunteer force matured and career opportunities increased, personnel costs
increased to the highest per capita in the world (Boucher, 1975). These manpower costs
cut into funds previously dedicated to modernization of equipment, reducing military
operational capability. Canada was at a tipping point and military service unification
seemed to be the means by which to balance the fiscal scales. As Canadian Minister of
National Defense, Paul Hellyer, argued:
Either the defense budget had to be substantially increased or substantial cost
reductions had to be made. Otherwise, funds would simply not be available for
the capital expenditures that are essential to effective military forces. (Hellyer,
1966: 10)
In addition to fiscal savings, when presenting the merits of the then-proposed
restructure, Hellyer also stated:
The amalgamation...will provide the flexibility to enable Canada to meet in the
most effective manner the military requirements of the future. It will also
establish Canada as an unquestionable leader in the field of military organization.
(Milberry, 1984: 367)
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Figure 3. Canadian Unified Military Structure (National Defence)

Boucher concludes his paper by examining the feasibility of the US adopting a
unified military organizational structure similar to Canada’s. While many of the motives
behind unification are salient in the US, namely the need to reduce fiscal expenditures
and functional redundancy, Boucher points to several reasons why the adoption of the
Canadian model may not be feasible. First, in 1975, the size of the Canadian military
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was only 3% of the US military. Extrapolating the same methodology to a much larger
force may be unachievable. Second, different political environments may be prohibitive.
Canadian legislators in the early 1960s were open to the integration and merger of forces.
Similar legislation in the US has been met with criticism. The US, by in large, is content
with the existing military services structure and does not want to entertain the idea of
merging services. Instead, any unification efforts to date have occurred through an
overarching joint staff structure to integrate actions between the firmly-rooted services.
Finally, the adversarial service parochial environment of the US military is a reflection of
American culture. In much the same way that it takes two lawyers to settle an argument
in a courtroom, it takes disagreement between more than one service chief to reach
correct military decisions (Boucher, 1975).
Singapore
Unlike Canada, Singapore established a unified military structure from the outset
upon declaring independence from Britain in 1965 (Singapore MINDEF). Figure 4,
Structure of the Singapore Armed Forces, delineates this structure. While visually
similar to the US DoD organizational chart, the difference lies in the role of the services.
All air functions belong to the Air Force, all land functions belong to the Army, all sea
functions belong to the Navy. Functional areas are clearly defined and everyone works
for a single Chief of Defence Force, not their respective service chief. The result is a
military that has been described as “one of the best forces in Southeast Asia, well-trained
and well-armed.” (Keegan, 1983: 520)
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Figure 4. Structure of the Singapore Armed Forces (Singapore MINDEF)
Britain
Former Leader of Britain’s Labor Party, Denis Healy, aptly described military
organizational reform in his country when he wrote that:
Trying to change the British Defence bureaucracy is as difficult as trying to
perform an appendix operation on a man while he is carrying a grand piano
upstairs. (Seib, 1984: np)
Despite the arduous challenge, Britain was able to accomplish sweeping defense
reform as it reorganized its military structure in the 1980s. Spurred by public outcry over
growing defense budgets, an overwhelming need for “jointness,” and streamlined policy
making efforts, a Ministry of Defence Organizational Review was convened in 1984.
The review articulated the reality that every modern day military operation is conducted
jointly; therefore, the military should be organized in such a way as to reflect this reality
(Pagan, 2003). The review recommended the elimination of its service ministers (akin to
US service secretaries) and other senior posts and the formation of a combined Ministry
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of State Staff. Although Britain retained separate services, each with its own identity, the
power and influence of the services were significantly diminished as compared to the
power and influence of the US services.
In the closing paragraphs of his US Army War College paper, Colonel Hector
Pagan acknowledges the difficulty in extrapolating the British experience to the current
US military organizational structure. The number of personnel, missions, equipment, and
infrastructure of the US military makes it a unique entity.

Proposed Models for the DoD
In his Air War College paper entitled, Doing Things That Can’t Be Done:
Creating an New Defense Establishment, Colonel Kenneth Keskel highlights several
flaws to the current DoD organizational structure before proposing an alternative
structure.
According to Keskel, the current DoD structure harbors three primary defects:
First, the organization bureaucracy has grown so large that it has become
inefficient. Second, service parochialism has grown from a positive motivator to
an Achilles’ heel, creating duplication of effort and misguided priorities. Third, it
is ill equipped to respond to the growing need to work with joint, interagency, and
coalition partners. (Keskel, 2002: 3)
To address these defects, Keskel argues for an organizational structure that
supports emerging missions, is within fiscal constraints, and improves “jointness” to
accomplish objectives in accordance with national security guidance.
To accomplish these objectives, he suggests delineating the “tooth” from the
“tail” of the services. The “tooth” refers to the core warfighting competencies of the
services. Colonel Keskel argues that these functions should be functionally re-aligned
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among smaller, more flexible corps (Air Corps, Naval Corps, Army Corps, etc.). The
“tail” refers to the support forces that sustain the services’ teeth. He suggests these
functions should be consolidated under a joint support force (Figure 5. Keskel’s
Proposed DoD Restructure). Keskel proposes six steps towards a reorganized DoD:
(1) Step One: Streamline overhead. Eliminate the three service secretary staffs and
transfer their functions up to OSD and realign down to the military departments.
(2) Step Two: Reduce layers. Transition and consolidate service-specific three-star
level commands into standing joint task forces.
(3) Step Three: Change mindset. Establish a joint promotion system.
(4) Step Four: Reduce duplication. Consolidate the numerous defense and service
support agencies performing similar functions into single agencies.
(5) Step Five: Increase flexibility. Transform the current military departments that
contain both “tooth” and “tail” to smaller, more flexible “corps” focused on core
competencies (tooth), and establish a joint support force (tail) to augment these
warfighting corps.
(6) Step Six: Adapt concepts. Modify the combatant command concept to better meet
the future spectrum of conflict. (Keskel, 2002: 35-36)
Keskel estimates four primary benefits of implementing such a structure. First,
the corps would be able to focus, exclusively, on their core competencies. Second,
functional duplication between services would be greatly reduced. Third, this structure
offers much greater flexibility to the combatant commander. Finally, interoperability
between forces and operating systems would be greatly enhanced.
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Figure 5. Keskel’s Proposed DoD Restructure (Keskel, 2002)

Colonel Leonard Kaplan proposes another alternative organizational structure for
the DoD in his paper, A Single Unified U.S. Military—A Modest Proposal. Kaplan
suggests the elimination of services and their staffs. He argues that the job of organizing,
training, and equipping forces should fall to the combatant commander since they will be
the ones to employ those forces in combat. Each combatant command would have air,
land, sea, and special operations forces assigned and functionally partitioned.
Under Kaplan’s proposed structure, he argues for a greater role of DoD-level
defense agencies. Each agency currently provides a functional service to the DoD. By
allowing the Defense Intelligence Agency to coordinate all intelligence functions, the
Defense Logistics Agency to coordinate all logistics operations, the Defense Information
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Systems Agency to coordinate all communication actions, etc. the DoD will significantly
streamline its operations.
The benefits of such a structure are summarized by the author:
The entire process would be streamlined since the CINCs would have the
predominant input into satisfying their warfighting needs currently and in the
future. The coordination needed for decisions would be reduced, there would be
much less parochialism and in-fighting, and the planning, programming, and
budgeting system would be streamlined. Efficiency should be greatly improved.
(Kaplan, 1993: 15)
Kaplan ends his paper by presenting several arguments against a unified military
structure. The first argument raised is one of tradition. The Army and Navy have
histories dating back over two hundred years. The culture of the services is firmly rooted
in the DoD, veterans organizations, and the American public. Second, Kaplan points out
that just as iron sharpens iron, so may service in-fighting enhance our military strength.
The US Government is built upon checks and balances. Since the US Military is a
reflection of the government it serves, should not checks and balances exist with the DoD
as well? Finally, Kaplan gives consideration to the potential concern of vesting too much
power in any one general. Under a unified command structure, one general would have
authority over the entire DoD and its forces. This general would still serve under the
control of civilian leadership, but the potential for a rogue general increase under a
unified structure.
In his Naval Postgraduate School paper, Toward a New Strategic Framework: A
Unified Command Plan for the New World Order, Captain John Quinn proposes another
alternative to the current DoD organizational structure. Quinn’s research is focused on
the Unified Command Plan (UCP), its roots and evolution, and the impact of service in-
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fighting on how we execute warfare today. To counter the influence of the services,
Quinn proposes a completely restructured hierarchical UCP framework.
Quinn cites Samuel Huntington’s view of organization of command (Huntington,
1984). Huntington calls for the establishment of:
Mission commands, not area commands. The current structure of unified and
specified commands thus often tends to unify things that should not be unified
and to divide things that should be under single command. (Huntington, 1984:
251)
In keeping with this philosophy, Quinn articulates the need for a UCP framework
by which to overcome inter-service problems and ensure the combat effectiveness of
forces:
To ensure success at the outset of hostilities requires a complete restructuring that
starts from the top - the structure of the Unified Command Plan - and builds down
with a conscious goal of meeting the operational needs of the CinC and limiting
(or eliminating) the deleterious impact of the service components on joint war
fighting. (Quinn, 1993: 120-121)
Specifically, Quinn proposes a UCP framework consisting of three Theater, two
Area, and five Forces Commands as follows:
(1) European Theater Command - includes projected in-theater forces in Europe
and the Mediterranean.
(2) Northeast Asia Theater Command - includes projected in-theater forces in
Korea, Japan, and Okinawa.
(3) Southwest Asia Theater Command - includes in-theater forces plus
training/traditional relationship with either the Rapid Deployment/Contingency
Force or the Mobilization/Reinforcing Forces Command.
(4) Atlantic Area Command - includes the Atlantic Expeditionary/Early
Reinforcing Forces Command.
(5) Pacific Area Command - includes the Pacific Expeditionary/Early Reinforcing
Forces Command.
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(6) Rapid Deployment Forces Command - includes XVIII Corps HQ (serving as a
JTF HQ), the 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, and 10th Mountain Divisions, the
23rd Wing, and Marine Air Contingency Force units.
(7) Reinforcing Forces Command - includes 'one of a kind' air units and the
partially-manned and mobilization air, sea, and land forces that comprise the
nation's conventional 'strategic reserve'.
(8) Strategic Deterrence and Defense Forces Command (STRATCOM).
(9) Strategic Transportation Forces Command (TRANSCOM).
(10) Special Operations Forces Command (SOCOM). (Quinn, 1993: 156-157)
According to the author, the benefits of such a framework are threefold. First, it
provides theater commanders, whom are charged with executing military operations,
greater flexibility and more forces. Second, it delineates UCP boundaries at sea, where
they are more easily de-conflicted. Finally, it allows for the flexible employment of
forces to accomplish strategic objectives. By retaining a worldwide focus, the JCS would
be able to apportion forces where they are most needed.
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Martignetti also proposes revision to the UCP in his
Army Command and General Staff College paper entitled, Déjà vu: The Unified
Command Plan of the Future Revisited. Martignetti argues for a complete revision of the
UCP based on functional missions versus the current regional construct.
According to Martignetti, the role of the UCP is to align available military
resources to tasks requisite to accomplish the NSS and NMS. He argues that the existing
UCP is not structured to ensure efficient operations across the entire national security
establishment. Due to cultural, philosophical, doctrinal, and organizational differences
between services and other government agencies, Martignetti argues that the traditional
military structure is neither efficient nor effective as it could be at meeting NSS
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objectives. Instead, the author argues for the dissolution of geographic commands and
replacing them with functional commands that can better integrate with other USG
Departments to provide a truly joint national response to any number of scenarios.
Martignetti summarizes the impetus for his proposed revision to the UCP as follows:
To be more efficient and effective, it is not only appropriate for the UCP to shift
from a regional focus to a functional focus, but it would be more appropriate for
the entire national security structure to align each of the elements of national
power within similar structures, thereby fostering cooperation and engagement.
(Martignetti, 2010: 38)
Martignetti states that terrorism, natural disasters, weapons of mass destruction,
space, information, and communications have no borders and therefore neither should our
military commands (Martignetti, 2010). The author argues for the creation of four
additional functional commands to complement the three functional combatant
commands currently in existence.
The first is the Homeland Defense Command (USHDCOM). This command
would focus on the defense of the US homeland and would coordinate closely with the
Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard. The second is the Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief Command (USHADRCOM). This command would work
closely with USG and non-governmental disaster-relief agencies. The third is the
Security and Stability (USSSCOM). This command would work with the US State
Department to provide security, stability, and reconstruction efforts globally. The fourth
is the War Command (USWARCOM). This command would be responsible to train for
and execute the US’ major combat operations (Martignetti, 2010).
Under Martignetti’s proposal, the Joint Staff and services’ structure and purpose
would remain intact. The Joint Staff would focus on future conflict, required legislation,
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and exercises. The services would organize, train, and equip forces for the seven
functional combatant commanders. Once partitioned, forces assigned to combatant
commanders would be assigned to a rapidly deployable Joint Task Force (JTF) cell from
the respective functional command.
If implemented, Martignetti estimates two major benefits of a revised UCP. First,
combatant commanders who are charged with executing military and humanitarian
operations will have greater flexibility, will be more responsive, and will have more
forces available to them. Second, as boundaries between commands disappear, cross-talk
amongst commands should increase.
A final proposed model for consideration is presented by Colonel Hector Pagan in
his US Army War College paper, Defense Reorganization, the Road Ahead for the 21st
Century. Pagan proposes eliminating the different service secretariat positions,
consolidating civilian control of the military under the SECDEF, and distributing tasks
appropriately across DoD and between the services (Pagan, 2003).
Pagan expresses that all large organizations, the DoD included, consumes
resources and talent, both military and civilian. He argues that the more layers of
leadership in an organization, the more insulated senior leadership is from the real issues.
This slows down actions and increases micro-management. Pagan looks to the successful
reform of the British military in the 1980s as contextual proof of concept for his proposal
to reduce layers of DoD leadership. He argues that:
Elimination of the service secretariats could yield almost immediate savings in
manpower and resources, which could easily be applied to operational units and
combatant commands worldwide. DOD needs to find redundancy, eliminate it, or
determine if those functions could be better served in the JCS or SECDEF staffs.
(Pagan, 2003: 12)
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If any of the aforementioned existing or proposed models is to be implemented by
the DoD, it would constitute a major reengineering effort. The following section
provides an overview of the concept of Business Process Reengineering (BPR), context
as BPR relates to the DoD, and an appraisal of quantitative measurement techniques for
assessing the expected results of reengineering efforts.

Organizational Business Process Reengineering
BPR Overview
In their flagship book on the topic, Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto
for Business Revolution, Michael Hammer and James Champy champion BPR and the
potential benefits organizations stand to reap from successful reengineering efforts
(Hammer & Champy, 1993). At its core:
Reengineering is the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures
of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed. (Hammer & Champy,
1993: 35)
The key words in this definition are fundamental, radical, processes, and
dramatic. Understanding each of these terms is important to the discussion at hand. In
order for changes in an organization to be fundamentally different, they must be radical.
Hammer states that:
At the heart of reengineering is the notion of discontinuous thinking – of
recognizing and breaking away from the outdated rules and fundamental
assumptions that underlie operations. Unless we change the rules, we are merely
rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. We cannot achieve breakthroughs in
performance by cutting fat or automating existing processes. Rather, we must
challenge old assumptions and shed the old rules that made the business
underperform in the first place. (Hammer, 1990: 107)
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The medium by which fundamental, radical change occurs is processes. Hammer
& Champy define processes as:
A collection of activities that takes one or more kinds of input and creates an
output that is of value to the customer. (Hammer & Champy, 1993: 38)
Implied in this definition is knowledge of who the customer is, and what they
value. The means by which value is assessed under BPR is through dramatic
improvements to contemporary performance measures such as cost, quality, service, and
speed. According to Hammer’s research, 40 percent decreases in costs, 40 percent
increases in quality and customer satisfaction, and 70 percent decreases in cycle time are
realistic goals for effective BPR efforts (Hammer, 1990). However, in order to realize
these improvements, organizations must take a holistic approach to reengineering.
Reengineering triggers changes of many kinds, not just of the business process
itself. Job designs, organizational structures, management systems – anything
associated with the process – must be refashioned in an integrated way. In other
words, reengineering is a tremendous effort that mandates change in many areas
of the organization. (Hammer, 1990: 112)
The next section relates the concepts of BPR to the DoD structure and in so doing,
provide a contextual framework by which to address the problem statement of this
research.

BPR and the DoD
The DoD is one of the largest organization in the world with some 2.2 million
active duty and civilian employees. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013) Reengineering
an organization the size of DoD seems an insurmountable task. However, current fiscal
realities may push the DoD to accomplish fundamental, radical changes to its processes
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in an attempt to realize dramatic cost savings. The challenge is immense because as
former Chairman of the JCS General George Jones once wrote, there are:
…two pervasive problems within DoD. First, we are too comfortable with the
past. Second, we do not make a sufficiently rigorous examination of defense
requirements and alternatives. By their very nature, large organizations have a
built-in resistance to change. As the largest organization in the free world, our
defense establishment has most of the problems of a large corporation but lacks
an easily calculated “bottom line” to force needed change. (Jones, 1996: 23)
Jones further added that:
Bureaucratic resistance to change is enormous and is reinforced by many allies of
the services—in Congress and elsewhere—who are bent on keeping the past
enthroned. (Jones, 1996: 27)
Lieutenant Colonel David Fautua, USA (Ret.), described the DoD’s resistance to
change in the context of joint operations when he wrote:
That the idea of joint culture is a seemingly self-contradictory proposition to the
ambitions of a self-professed joint military remains a puzzling paradox. Equally
astonishing is how the term has survived as an expression of a possible truth even
as proponents for “jointness” decry initiatives that might actually draw the
services closer or recoil at the slightest suggestion of delimiting service cultures.
(Fautua, 2000: 86)
To accomplish reengineering within the DoD, consideration must be given to the
basic precepts of BPR as they relate to the DoD. These precepts are customers and
processes.
Understanding who the customers of an organization are shapes the organization’s
reengineering efforts to satisfy the needs of those customers. For military services,
customers include the American people, elected civilian leaders, and combatant
commanders. American taxpayers and civilian leaders value a low cost to sustain quality
military services. From an operational perspective, combatant commanders utilize the
forces provided by the services to accomplish objectives in accordance with the NSS and
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NMS. These combatant commanders value quality, service, and speed from the forces
provided them from the military services.
Combatant commanders are primarily concerned with processes (positioning
forces, striking targets, resupplying bases, etc.). Military services are primarily focused
on the functions they perform as described in DoDD 5100.01. Because military services
are first and foremost focused on their own functions, which are not necessarily in tune
with the processes that their customers (combatant commanders) expect, there is
inherently discord. The result is service parochialism, redundant functionality between
services, and a lack of fit between missions in the DoD. To truly reengineer, the DoD
must take a congruent, process-focused view. This view should focus on the efficient
organization of inputs (services) to maximize outputs (processes) to combatant
commanders at the minimum cost (to satisfy the American people and elected civilian
leaders). A primary step towards this end is reorganizing the DoD under a unified
structure that, having stripped away redundancy, is enabled to orient itself to perform the
processes required by the customer in a cost-effective manner. This first step, a
monumental task in and of itself, is the focus of this research.
To understand the magnitude of the effort required to reengineer the DoD, it is
helpful to look to the private sector at other “large” organizations that have successfully
implemented reengineering initiatives. Perhaps the largest company to successfully
reengineer their business operations was International Business Machines Corporation
(IBM) in the early 1990s. In his reflective account of reengineering efforts, Who Says
Elephants Can’t Dance, previous IBM CEO Louis Gerstner recounts some of the major
issues he and his team of “IBMers” overcame (Gerstner, 2002).
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In the late 1980s IBM was the undisputed worldwide leader in computer
processing technology. Employing over 300,000 employees in 160 countries with a net
worth of over $65 Billion USD, the IBM of the late 1980s certainly qualifies as a large
corporation (Gerstner, 2002). Despite its size and large market share, especially in
mainframe computing, IBM was not immune to hardship. In the early 1990s, IBM began
losing market shares to upstart competitors like Microsoft, Oracle, and Sun
Microsystems. Realizing that the company was losing billions of dollars each quarter,
the board of directors sought new leadership that could right the IBM ship. Louis
Gerstner was appointed CEO of IBM in April 1993. Gerstner immediately recognized
that many of IBMS business processes were cumbersome and very expensive. In
response, Gerstner led the decade-long charge to completely reengineer IBMs main
business processes.
Gerstner understood that reengineering would not be easy, but he also understood
it to be essential if he was to save IBM. One of Gerstner’s senior executives aptly
commented that:
Reengineering is like starting a fire on your head and putting it out with a
hammer. (Gerstner, 2002: 64)
Gerstner further defined the problems at IBM:
We were bloated. We were inefficient. We had piled redundancy on top of
redundancy. We were running inventory systems, accounting systems, fulfillment
systems, and distribution systems that were all, to a greater or lesser degree, the
mutant offspring of systems built in the early mainframe days and then adapted
and patched together to fit the needs of one of twenty-four independent business
units. … The result was the business equivalent of the railroad systems of the
nineteenth century—different tracks, different gauges, different specifications for
the rolling stock. If we had a financial issue that required the cooperation of
several business units to resolve, we had no common way of talking about it
because we were maintaining 266 different ledger systems. (Gerstner, 2002: 64)
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Understanding the depth and breadth of IBM’s problems, Gerstner made the
decision to reengineer IBMs core business processes concurrently versus sequentially.
These core processes included hardware development, software development, order
fulfillment, integrated supply chain, customer relationship management, and services.
Each of these core processes were composed of many lesser internal processes. In total,
Gerstner and his team embarked on 60 major reengineering projects throughout the 1990s
(Gerstner, 2002). The results of IBM’s reengineering efforts amounted to $14 Billion
USD in overall savings, $15 Billion USD in avoided materials costs, a 65 percent
improvement in on time delivery rates, a reduction of $80 Million USD in inventory
carrying costs, and the reduction of delivery costs by $270 Million USD (Gerstner, 2002).
IBM’s success with reengineering, while remarkable, is not unprecedented. The
next section highlights tools and techniques that have proven successful in reengineering
efforts. These tools and techniques may also be used as guideposts by which to organize
reengineer initiatives.

Assessing the Effectiveness of BPR
For organizations that have successfully accomplished reengineering, it is
relatively simple to assess the effectiveness of BPR. Those organizations need only
compare the cost, quality, service, and speed pre- and post-reengineering. For
organizations considering reengineering, the assessment is much more difficult.
Estimating improvements in cost, quality, service, and speed of proposed changes is an
arduous task. In their literature review of BPR, Peter O’Neill and Amrik Sohal highlight
five tools and techniques by which organizations might accomplish BPR (O’Neill &
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Sohal, 1999). Consideration of how these tools and techniques effect change in an
organization may prove useful in estimating the extent of those changes.
The first BPR tool/technique is process visualization. Many authors argue that a
clearly defined end state is essential before reengineering begins (O’Neill & Sohal,
1999). Still others argue for a clear vision of the entire process, not just the desired end
state. (Barrett, 1994).
A second BPR tool/technique is process mapping/operational method study. The
Integrated Data Method, Data Flow Diagrams, Object Oriented Analysis, and Process
Based Project Management are examples of this tool/technique (O’Neill & Sohal, 1999).
A third BPR tool/technique is change management. This approach takes into
account the human side of reengineering by focusing on the management of
organizational change (O’Neill & Sohal, 1999). Humans often perceive change as a
major threat to themselves or their jobs. Therefore, some authors argue that change
management is perhaps the most important task in reengineering (Mumford & Geert,
1994).
A fourth BPR tool/technique is benchmarking. Several authors propose that
benchmarking is an integral part of BPR as it allows for the visualization and process
development of processes that exist in like organizations (O’Neill & Sohal, 1999).
The fifth and final BPR tool/technique according to O’Neill & Sohal is process
and customer focus. As previously mentioned, reengineering must be focused on the
processes that satisfy the needs of its customers.
Hammer & Champy close their book with a synopsis of ways to succeed at BPR
(Hammer & Champy, 1993). It is worth considering four of these points in closing this
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section. Knowing common pitfalls and how to avoid them is important when chartering
reengineering initiatives.
First, organizations must change processes instead of attempting to fix them. If a
process is truly broken, it must be reengineered, it should not be “fixed” through
patchwork improvements in the form of automation, downsizing, and motivational
programs. The tendency is to attempt to improve outcomes while keeping existing
organizational structures and dysfunctional processes instead of starting from scratch to
restructure the organization and develop processes to focus on meeting customer needs.
Hammer & Champy state that only processes can be reengineered, not organizational
units. They also state:
Incrementalism is the path of least resistance for most organizations. It is also the
surest way to fail at reengineering. (Hammer & Champy, 1993: 223)
Second, organizations must not quit their reengineering efforts too early. Many
companies abandon reengineering initiatives at the first sign of trouble to return to the
comfort of preexisting processes. Still other companies quit after initial reengineering
success. Satisfied with minor improvements, these companies forfeit the huge payoffs
awaiting firms that successfully reengineer (Hammer & Champy, 1993).
Third, reengineering efforts should not be dragged out. Once an organization’s
leadership decides to reengineer its processes, change should come quickly. Hammer &
Champy argue that twelve months is time enough for an organization to move from
announcement to tangible action. Not all reengineering efforts will be completed in this
first year, but there must be early evidence of success; else, employees will become
distracted, impatient, and confused with regard to BPR (Hammer & Champy, 1993).
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Finally, reengineering should not be attempted when the CEO is within two years
of retirement. Reengineering is a major muscle movement for an organization. It
requires a high level of enthusiasm and commitment from senior leadership. It is
improbable that a leader nearing the end of their career would take on such an ambitious
undertaking. Also, in order to succeed at reengineering, a company must remain focused
on a clear vision of where their efforts will take them in the end. Frequent changes in
leadership (and therefore leadership’s vision) disrupts past reengineering
accomplishments and threatens future reengineering success. (Hammer & Champy,
1993).

Summary
A review of existing literature on the topic was presented in three sections. First,
a review of the history behind the current DoD organizational structure to include the US
Constitution, the National Security Act of 1947, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
Second, an appraisal of current unified force structures in use by other countries and an
examination of proposed models for the DoD. Finally, a review of methodologies used to
estimate the effectiveness of organizational reengineering. Collectively, this literature
review provides the predicate framework for a methodology by which a comprehensive
fiscal analysis of the current DoD structure is presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
examines the results of the analysis as they relate to the three IQs. Finally, Chapter 5
discusses analysis of the results, to include recommendations for future research and use
within the DoD.
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III. Methodology
Overview
This chapter describes, in seven sections, the methodology used to assess the
potential impact of the DoD transitioning to a functionally-aligned, unified organizational
structure. The first section discusses benchmarking in detail. The second section
outlines the proposed organizational structure based on existing and proposed models
previously described in the literature review. The next three sections describe the
methodology used to benchmark major functions from a fiscal perspective, between the
four services. First, a qualitative analysis of overlapping functions by military service
will highlight areas of functional redundancy. Second, a quantitative assessment of the
size of force provided by each service enables comparison of functions between services
in like units. Third, a quantitative analysis of the DoD’s budget request for FY2013
identifies requested budgeted amounts from each service to perform functional missions.
The sixth section describes methodology for benchmarking between services. This
section combines data from the previous two sections, identifies the lowest budget
requests per function by service. This baseline per-function rate is applied as a
benchmark to extrapolate across all services, forming a baseline fiscal savings figure over
the current DoD structure. The final section briefly describes methodology for content
analysis of existing literature to assess the non-financial benefits of a unified,
functionally-aligned DoD structure.
Benchmarking
Originating with Xerox in 1979, benchmarking is a powerful tool for improving
many aspects of an organization (Abalateo & Lee, 1993). At its core, benchmarking is:
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The formal process of measuring and comparing a company’s operations,
products, and services against those of top performers both within and outside that
company’s primary industry. (Altany, 1991: 12).
According to Camp, the process of benchmarking consists of five phases:
planning, analysis, integration, action, and maturity (Camp, 1989). Altany summarizes
these phases in a typical benchmarking scenario:
The process itself is so straightforward and simple. A senior manager typically
will start by deciding what part of the company to benchmark. The manager then
instructs specialists in that area to determine what company is the very best at that
function and to start collecting data to exchange with that company. After
analyzing the data, a strategic plan is developed to incorporate the most effective
approaches used by the benchmarked company. (Altany, 1991: 11)
With a basic understanding of the process of benchmarking, it is worth examining
a taxonomy of the different types of benchmarking. According to D.R. Hull, former
manager of benchmarking for AT&T, benchmarking can be divided into two types, broad
and specific (Foster, 1992). These categories are further divided as shown in Figure 6:
Broad
- Strategic
- Operational
Specific
- Internal
- Generic
- Competitive
- Functional
- Working-task
- Function-wide
- Management-process
- Total-operation
Figure 6. Levels of Benchmarking (Abalateo & Lee, 1993: 14)
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For this research, benchmarking will be applied both broadly (Strategic) and
specifically (Function-wide). According to Abalateo & Lee, strategic benchmarking
deals with the long term goals of an organization. Conversely, function-wide
benchmarking deals with all relevant tasks in a specific function (Abalateo & Lee, 1993).
This research considers the long term strategic goals of the DoD under the purview of a
revised organizational structure. Specific functions are benchmarked between services to
potentially improve operational efficiency of the DoD.

Proposed Organizational Structure
Examining the existing national models for defense establishments and the
proposed organizational structures for the DoD in the literature review, a hybrid structure
is proposed. Taking key components from several models may yield the best option for a
functionally-aligned, unified organizational structure. The foundation of this hybrid
structure is based on Keskel’s model.
Keskel’s model proposes separating the “teeth” from the “tail” of the military of
services. The teeth of the services are those core functions that each service is uniquely
positioned to accomplish (Keskel, 2002). These functions would fall under the purview
of the military service that is functionally designated to perform the function. To clearly
delineate functional areas between the services, existing services would be re-designated
as corps, similar to the current structure of the United States Marine Corps. All air
functions would be re-aligned under an Air Corps, all land functions under am Army
Corps, all maritime functions under a Naval Corps, all amphibious operations under the
Marine Corps, all space functions under a Space Corps, and all special operations
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functions under a Special Operations Corps. All other functions that support these core
missions, Keskel’s tail functions, would follow the recommendation of Kaplan and be realigned under existing DoD-level defense agencies (Kaplan, 1993). This is a departure
from Keskel’s recommendation for the establishment of a Joint Support Force to manage
the tail functions.
The DoD currently operates 17 defense agencies and 10 field activities (U.S.
Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, 2010). Appendix 2. DoD Defense Agencies,
lists these agencies and activities and provides a brief description of their current
functional mission. These agencies and activities are uniquely suited to coordinate
support (tail) functions across the separate military corps. Most support functions
described in DoDD 5100.01 fit within one of these existing agencies or activities. In
addition to existing defense agencies and field activities, the proposed organizational
structure adds a Defense Medical Agency to coordinate and operate all medical functions,
a Defense Civil Engineering Agency to coordinate and oversee maintenance and
construction of infrastructure, and a Defense Recruiting Activity to coordinate and
execute all recruiting actions.
If core military functions are the responsibilities of the corps and support
functions reside with the appropriate defense agency, there is diminished value in
maintaining the service secretaries and their staffs. As suggested by Pagan, the proposed
organizational structure presented eliminates the service chiefs and their staffs,
consolidating civilian control under the SECDEF (Pagan, 2003).
A final change to the existing DoD organizational structure is the elimination of
USSOCOM. With the addition of a Special Operations Corps, the need for USSOCOM is
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diminished. Instead, special operations forces would be organized, trained, and equipped
by the corps and employed by the existing geographic combatant commanders.
Depicted in Figure 7, Proposed DoD Organizational Structure, these four
proposed changes take the form of a revised DoD organizational structure that is
functionally-align and unified. The next three sections describe the methodology by
which this research seeks to assess the potential benefits of such a structure.

SECDEF

Joint Staff

Unified
Commands

Defense
Agencies

Air Corps

Naval Corps

Army Corps

Marine
Corps

Space Corps

Special
Operations
Corps

Figure 7. Proposed DoD Organizational Structure

Qualitative Analysis of Overlapping Functions
As discussed in the previous two chapters, DoDD 5100.01 defines the functions
for which each military service and department are responsible. A synopsis of these
functions may be found at Appendix A. For the reader’s convenience, the major
functions of the DoD are summarized in Table 1:
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Table 1. Major Functions of Military Services
Service-Specific Functions
Land Operations
Maritime Operations
Air Operations
Nuclear Operations
Air and Missile Defense Operations
Riverine Operations
Space Operations
Airborne Operations
ISR Operations
Civil Affairs Operations
Aeromedical Evacuation Operations
Establish Initial Military Government
Civil Works Programs
Security Operations
Functions Common to all Military Services
Training for Joint Operations and Joint Exercises
Organize, Train, and Equip Forces
Cyberspace Operations
Special Operations
Personnel Recovery Operations
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
Building Partnership Capacity
Forcible Entry Operations
Presidential Support
Antiterrorism
Support Civil Authorities
Conduct Operational Testing and Evaluation
Command and Control
Force Protection

Analyzing which service performs which of these major functions will identify
areas of redundant functionality. Knowing where redundancy exists between military
services narrows the scope of this research to focus on those functional areas. The next
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section describes the methodology utilized for quantitative assessment of the size of force
provided by each service for each function.

Quantitative Assessment of Size of Force
Knowing the overlap of functions provided by military services, the next step is to
determine the size of the force associated with each function by service. For example,
DoDD 5100.01 states that all four services provide forces in support of air operations, the
questions are how many and what type of forces? There is no sole source for this data.
Instead, size-of-force data is spread across service budget justification books, service and
joint factsheets, Congressional Research Services (CRS) reports, and QDR reports. A
consolidated worksheet of data to be collected is presented in Table 2:

Table 2. Size of Force Data Worksheet
Functional Area
1. Personnel
Active Duty Officer Personnel (K)
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel (K)
Civilian Personnel (K)
Cadets (K)
PCS Moves (K)
2. Operations and Maintenance
2.1. Air Operations
Flying Hours (K)
Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI)
2.2. Land Operations
Divisions
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance
2.3. Space Operations
Supported Satellites in Orbit
2.4. Air and Missile Defense Operations
Interceptors/Radars Supported

USA
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Size of Force (#)
USN
USMC

USAF

2.5. ISR Operations
UAVs
2.6. Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support Activities
Total Personnel (K)
2.7. Recruiting and Training
Total Training Population (K)
Enlisted Recruit Output (K)
3. Procurement
3.1. Aircraft
Fighter/Attack Aircraft
Rotary Wing Aircraft
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft
Strategic UAVs
Aircraft Modifications (TAI)
Repair/Spare Parts and Support (TAI)
3.2. Land Vehicles
Tactical/Support Vehicles
3.3. Munitions and Missiles
Air to Ground Munitions
Tactical Missiles
3.4. Air and Missile Defense
Interceptors/Radars
4. Military Construction
Square Feet Maintained (M)
5. Family Housing
Adequate Housing Units Maintained

To facilitate data collection, the functional activities in Table 2 are divided in
accordance with budget appropriation titles. The DoD’s annual budget request to
Congress is divided into seven appropriation titles: Personnel, Operations and
Maintenance, Procurement, Research and Development, Military Construction, Family
Housing, and Revolving Funds. These appropriation titles form the foundation for
analysis from this point forward.
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However, some of the data associated with each of these appropriation titles is not
sufficiently complete to conduct detailed analysis as prescribed here within. The research
utilized three criteria to determine the feasibility of including an appropriation title, or
subcategory, in further analysis (Figure 8, Data Inclusion Criteria). The first criterion
was classification. Certain size of force data may be classified and will therefore be
unavailable for analysis as this research is unclassified. The second criterion was a
common point of reference between services. In order to analyze redundant functions
between services, there must be a common basis for size-of-force comparison. If no such
basis was available, the data was excluded from analysis. The final criterion for data
inclusion was availability of associated budget request data for the given function. The
importance of this criterion is apparent in the next section, which describes the
methodology utilized to perform quantitative analysis on the DoD’s budget request for
FY2013.

Criterion 1 – Data Classification
Criterion 2 – Common Size-of-Force Reference Point
Criterion 3 – Availability of Budget Request Data
Figure 8. Data Inclusion Criteria

Quantitative Assessment of Budget Requests
As previously stated in Chapter I, budget requests originate with the military
services, are vetted by military departments, and consolidated at the DoD for submission
to Congress. To analyze budget requests in any detail, it is necessary to examine budget
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requests at the service level, before they are consolidated by the DoD. Each military
service publishes budget request data on their respective financial management websites.
Citations for these websites are provided with the actual data in Chapter IV. Service
budget requests are published under the seven appropriation titles described in the
previous section. These seven appropriation titles are further divided into subtitles.
These subtitles are then further divided into BACs and budget sub-activity codes.
Collectively, this data provides information on how much money each military service
budgets for separate functional areas. A consolidated worksheet of data to be collected is
presented in Table 3:

Table 3. Budget Request Data Worksheet
Budget Request Amount ($Million)
USA
USN
USMC
USAF

Functional Area
1. Personnel
Active Duty Officer Personnel ($M)
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel ($M)
Civilian Personnel ($M)
Cadets ($M)
PCS Moves ($M)
2. Operations and Maintenance
2.1. Air Operations
Flying Hours ($M)
Total Aircraft Inventory ($M)
2.2. Land Operations
Divisions ($M)
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance ($M)
2.3. Space Operations
Supported Satellites in Orbit ($M)
2.4. Air and Missile Defense Operations
Interceptors/Radars Supported ($M)
2.5. ISR Operations
UAVs ($M)
2.6. Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support Activities
52

Total Cost ($M)
2.7. Recruiting and Training
Total Training Population ($M)
Enlisted Recruit Output ($M)
3. Procurement
3.1. Aircraft
Fighter/Attack Aircraft ($M)
Rotary Wing Aircraft ($M)
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft ($M)
Strategic UAVs ($M)
Aircraft Modifications ($M)
Repair/Spare Parts and Support ($M)
3.2. Land Vehicles
Tactical/Support Vehicles
3.3. Munitions and Missiles
Air to Ground Munitions ($M)
Tactical Missiles ($M)
3.4. Air and Missile Defense
Interceptors/Radars ($M)
4. Military Construction
Square Feet Maintained ($M)
5. Family Housing
Adequate Housing Units Maintained ($M)
DEPARTMENT TOTALS
DoD TOTAL

Benchmarking Between Services

Combining data from the previous two sections, size-of-force data and budget
request data, the research examines the operational efficiency of the services. For this
research, operational efficiency is measured as a rate of dollars per unit of function as
shown in Equation 1:

Operational Efficiency =
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$ USD
Unit of Function

(1)

The ‘Unit of Function’ in this equation is different for each functional area
assessed. It is the unit associated with size of force data in Table 2.
Examining operational efficiency rates for each service with redundant functional
capability allows for comparison between services. For any given function, one service
may perform that function at a lower rate than the other services. This low-cost-to-serve
rate serves as the benchmark for the DoD for that function. This benchmarked rate may
then be applied across that function throughout the entire DoD. When this methodology
is applied to all functions within the DoD, the result is a potential fiscal savings from
benchmarking operations between services. Figure 9, Methodology Flow Chart,
summarizes this methodology, utilizing table nomenclature from Chapter 4.
In order to realize potential fiscal savings, the DoD must be organized in a
manner conducive to implementation. This is the link between organizational structure
and benchmarking. For the DoD to effectively benchmark operations between existing
services would require an unprecedented, and improbable, level of inter-service
coordination and the extermination of service parochialism. Instead, a revised
organizational structure, that is functionally-aligned to provide a unified force may
provide a more salient framework by which to implement benchmarking initiatives and
thereby realize meaningful fiscal savings.

54

Figure 9. Methodology Flow Chart

Content Analysis of Non-Financial Benefits
Various scholars have authored papers that propose alterations to the current DoD
organizational structure. Some of these papers were reviewed under the literature review
in the previous section. Many of these authors articulate potential non-financial benefits
to their espoused structure. By performing a content analysis of these papers, searching
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for non-financial benefits, this research presents a consolidated list of potential nonfinancial benefits if the DoD were to reengineer towards a unified, functionally-aligned
organizational structure.

Summary

This chapter described, in seven sections, the methodology used to assess the
potential impact of the DoD transitioning to a functionally-aligned, unified organizational
structure. The first section discussed benchmarking in greater detail. The second section
outlined the proposed organizational structure based on existing and proposed models
previously described in the literature review. The third section examined a qualitative
analysis of overlapping functions by military services to highlight areas of functional
redundancy. The fourth section, a quantitative assessment of the size of force, enabled
comparison of functions between services in like units. The fifth section provided a
quantitative analysis of the DoD’s budget request. The sixth section described
methodology for benchmarking between services and linked benchmarking to
organizational structure. The final section presented a methodology by which to assess
the non-financial benefits of a reorganized DoD. The following chapter covers results of
this proposed methodology as applied to the DoD’s budget request for FY2013. Finally,
Chapter V discusses analysis of the results, to include recommendations for future
research and use within the DoD.
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IV. Results and Analysis
Overview

This chapter implements the methodology from Chapter III to evaluate the three
investigative questions posed in Chapter I. All results and subsequent analysis are for
FY2013.

IQ 1. What functional areas overlap between military services?

The functions of the military services are defined in DoDD 5100.01. A synopsis
of these functions is consolidated in Appendix A. For the reader’s convenience, these
functions are further distilled in Table 4:
Table 4. Functional Redundancy Between Military Services
Service-Specific Functions
USA
USN
USMC



Land Operations


Maritime Operations



Air Operations

Nuclear Operations


Air and Missile Defense Operations



Riverine Operations


Space Operations

Airborne Operations

ISR Operations

Civil Affairs Operations

Aeromedical Evacuation Operations


Establish Initial Military Government


Civil Works Programs

Security Operations
Functions Common to all Military Services
USA
USN
USMC



Training for Joint Operations and Joint Exercises



Organize, Train, and Equip Forces



Cyberspace Operations



Special Operations



Personnel Recovery Operations
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USAF









USAF






Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
Building Partnership Capacity
Forcible Entry Operations
Presidential Support
Antiterrorism
Support Civil Authorities
Conduct Operational Testing and Evaluation
Command and Control
Force Protection









































As delineated in Table 4, all but two of the service-specific functions defined in
DoDD 5100.01 are redundant between two or more services. Air operations are the most
redundant function, common among all four services. Land operations, air and missile
defense operations, riverine operations, and space operations are redundant among three
services. Maritime operations, nuclear operations, airborne operations, ISR operations,
aeromedical evacuation operations, establishment of initial military government, and civil
works programs are redundant among two services. Seven functional areas were
excluded from further analysis because they did not meet the data inclusion criteria from
Figure 8.
Maritime operations were excluded because the function is redundant between the
USN and the USMC, but these services provide complimentary rather than redundant
capability. Nuclear operations were excluded because of the strategic importance of a
nuclear triad across multiple functional realms. Airborne operations and aeromedical
evacuations were excluded because the USA and USAF provide complimentary, not
redundant, capabilities under these overarching functional capabilities. Riverine
operations, establishment of initial military government, and civil works programs were
excluded due to lack of size-of-force and or budget request data for these functions. All
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other redundant functions were analyzed in the next section in accordance with the
methodology described in Chapter III.

IQ 2. Could the DoD reduce its budget requests by adopting a functionally-aligned,
unified structure?

To answer this investigative question, size of force and budget request data for
each functional area, by service, was collected using the worksheets from Table 2. and
Table 3. This data was divided between five appropriation titles used by the PPBES:
Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, Military Construction, and Family
Housing. Research and Development and Revolving Funds were removed due to a lack
of sufficient data in accordance with the data inclusion criteria from Figure 8. The results
and subsequent analysis of the research to answer this IQ are divided between three
sections: size-of-force data, budget request data, and operational efficiency results.

Size-of-Force Data Results

Utilizing service budget justification books, service and joint factsheets, and QDR
and CRS reports, size-of-force data was collected on functions redundant to two or more
military services. Source data for figures in Table 5. Size-of-Force Results, are listed as
endnotes.
Table 5. Size-of-Force Results
Functional Area
1. Personnel
Active Duty Officer Personnel (K)
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel (K)
Civilian Personnel (K)
Cadets (K)
PCS Moves (K)
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USA

Size of Force (#)
USN
USMC

USAF

99.81
447.81
255.91
4.51
266.84

51.32
266.92
188.52
4.52
162.15

64.43
259.73
184.13
3.93
147.37

21.22
176.12
23.62
-99.96

2. Operations and Maintenance
2.1. Air Operations
Flying Hours (K)
2938
Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI)
19388
2.2. Land Operations
Divisions
188
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance
1118
2.3. Space Operations
Supported Satellites in Orbit
-2.4. Air and Missile Defense Operations
Interceptors/Radars Supported
22012
2.5. ISR Operations
UAVs
211513
2.6. Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support Activities
Total Personnel (K)
8081
2.7. Recruiting and Training
Total Training Population (K)
8081
Enlisted Recruit Output (K)
35.68
3. Procurement
3.1. Aircraft
Fighter/Attack Aircraft
-Rotary Wing Aircraft
17912
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft
214
Strategic UAVs
1912
Aircraft Modifications (TAI)
19388
Repair/Spare Parts and Support (TAI)
19388
3.2. Land Vehicles
Tactical/Support Vehicles
383112
3.3. Munitions and Missiles
Air to Ground Munitions
-Tactical Missiles
200812
3.4. Air and Missile Defense
Interceptors/Radars
4312
4. Military Construction
Square Feet Maintained (M)
96217
5. Family Housing
Adequate Housing Units Maintained
988818
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10549
39839

11703
52393

---

410
16511

---

920

--

6220

13414

--

814

319412

23512

7322

5123

5112
29.59

2212
25.511

5123
28.413

4812
5412
5112
612

-2712
---

1917
417
715
2412
52393
52393

--

4012

--

28012
38912

---

340316
43412

912

--

--

49119

17819

63419

572621

79821

2655619

39839
39839
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Size-of-Force Data Analysis

When analyzing size-of-force data, the unit of function is of fundamental
importance. In order to compare functions between services, a common point of
reference is required. This common point of reference is different for every function.
For example, for air operations, total flying hours and total aircraft inventory (TAI) were
selected because each unit represented the size of force provided for air operations from
each of the four services. Each unit of function was carefully selected to provide a
meaningful comparison between services. Consideration was given to commonality
between services for both size-of-force units and availability of budget request data tied
to those functions. The next two sections describe the results and analysis of budget
request data.

Budget Request Results

For each of the functions identified in Table 5, budget request data was collected
from service budget justification books and budget summary reports. This data
represents the amount that each service requested during FY2013 to perform the
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prescribed function. Source data for figures in Table 6. Budget Request Results, are
listed as endnotes.

Table 6. Budget Request Results
Functional Area
1. Personnel
Active Duty Officer Personnel ($M)
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel ($M)
Civilian Personnel ($M)
Cadets ($M)
PCS Moves ($M)
2. Operations and Maintenance
2.1. Air Operations
Flying Hours ($M)
Total Aircraft Inventory* ($M)
2.2. Land Operations
Divisions ($M)
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance ($M)
2.3. Space Operations
Supported Satellites in Orbit ($M)
2.4. Air and Missile Defense Operations
Interceptors/Radars Supported ($M)
2.5. ISR Operations
UAVs ($M)
2.6. Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support
Total Cost ($M)
2.7. Recruiting and Training
Total Training Population ($M)
Enlisted Recruit Output ($M)
3. Procurement
3.1. Aircraft
Fighter/Attack Aircraft ($M)
Rotary Wing Aircraft ($M)
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft ($M)
Strategic UAVs ($M)
Aircraft Modifications ($M)
Repair/Spare Parts and Support ($M)
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Budget Request Amount ($Million)
USA
USN
USMC
USAF
111481
272761
91178
781
17871

80065
188405
81409
775
10315

7318
5898

28666
104786
165811
-5666

60539
34999

91317
178227
836013
707
12907

477813
1077313

211178
848

---

534811
9911

---

--

2399

--

48913

11514

8614

--

5914

128
Activities
130348
41388
5818

-412516
1916
53416
127716
37616

609

24815

89979,11

781013

14649
2569

68911
18711

352113
14813

547520
-23
3096
79112
23
3586
-23
125
-23
2029
165823

312417
29417
53917
88517
361017
205317

3.2. Land Vehicles
Tactical/Support Vehicles
3.3. Munitions and Missiles
Air to Ground Munitions ($M)
Tactical Missiles ($M)
3.4. Air and Missile Defense
Interceptors/Radars ($M)
4. Military Construction
Square Feet Maintained ($M)
5. Family Housing
Adequate Housing Units Maintained ($M)
DEPARTMENT TOTALS
DoD TOTAL

50612

--

3712

--

-44812

12812
101712

---

55812
14412

133812

39012

--

--

40178

21019

82511

264613

53020

26321

1821

58222

102977

100325
282550

79248

* Budget request data is a summation of all activities supporting air operations, minus
budgeted amount for flying hours, in support of TAI.
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Department of the Navy FY2013 Budget Submission Justification Book Volume 1, Aircraft
Procurement, Navy. (2012, February). Retrieved from
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/13pres/BOOKS.htm

Budget Request Analysis

The budget requests for the functional areas assessed in Table 6 account for
nearly $281 Billion USD, or 54% of the DoD’s $526.2 Billion USD Defense Budget
Request for FY 2013. Only functions of the military services were assessed. Defensewide functions were not included. Further, only active duty functions were assessed,
analysis of guard and reserve functions was beyond the scope of this research.
Additionally, only five of the seven appropriation titles were assessed. Finally, within the
appropriation titles that were assessed, not every functional area was examined based on
criteria from Figure 8. Collectively, these limitations account for the remaining 46% of
the DoD’s budget request for FY 2013.
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Having obtained results from analysis of size of force and budget request data, the
next step to answer this IQ is to overlay these results to determine operational efficiency
rates for each redundant function within each service. The next section provides
operational efficiency results and analysis of potential budget request savings under a
functionally-aligned unified DoD organizational structure.

Operational Efficiency Results

Knowing the results of the size of force and budget request analyses, the next
analytical step is to overlay Table 5 and Table 6 to develop a table of operational
efficiency rates. These rates are displayed in Table 7, Operational Efficiency Rates. The
bolded/italicized rate represents the lowest rate for that function between the four military
services.
Table 7: Operational Efficiency Rates
Functional Area
1. Personnel
Active Duty Officer Personnel ($M/Officer)
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel ($M/Enlisted)
Civilian Personnel ($M/Civilian)
Cadets ($M/Cadet)
PCS Moves ($M/PCS Move)
2. Operations and Maintenance
2.1. Air Operations
Flying Hours ($M/Flying Hour)
Total Aircraft Inventory* ($M/Aircraft)
2.2. Land Operations
Divisions ($M/Division)
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance ($M/Vehicle)
2.3. Space Operations
Supported Satellites in Orbit ($M/Satellite)
2.4. Air and Missile Defense Operations
Interceptors/Radars Supported ($M/Int. or Radar)
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Rate ($Million/Unit of Function)
USA
USN
USMC
USAF
0.1117
0.0609
0.0356
0.0173
0.0067

0.1561
0.0706
0.0432
0.0171
0.0064

0.1352
0.0595
0.0703
-0.0057

0.0057
0.8785

0.0025
0.3039

0.1418
0.0686
0.0454
0.0179
0.0088

0.0041
2.0563

1173.3
0.7568

---

1337.0
0.6000

---

--

29.875

--

7.887

0.5227

0.6418

--

7.3750

2.5. ISR Operations
UAVs ($M/UAV)
0.0057
2.6. Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support Activities
Total Cost ($M/Personnel)
0.0161
2.7. Recruiting and Training
Total Training Population ($M/Personnel)
0.0051
Enlisted Recruits ($M/Recruit)
0.0163
3. Procurement
3.1. Aircraft
Fighter/Attack Aircraft ($M/Aircraft)
-Rotary Wing Aircraft ($M/Aircraft)
23.045
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft ($M/Aircraft)
9.5000
Strategic UAVs ($M/UAV)
28.105
Aircraft Modifications ($M/Aircraft) (TAI)
0.6588
Repair/Spare Parts & Support ($M/Aircraft) (TAI)
0.1940
3.2. Land Vehicles
Tactical/Support Vehicles ($M/Vehicle)
0.1321
3.3. Munitions and Missiles
Air to Ground Munitions ($M/Munitions)
-Tactical Missiles ($M/Missile)
0.2231
3.4. Air and Missile Defense
Interceptors/Radars ($M/Int. or Radar)
31.116
4. Military Construction
Square Feet Maintained ($/Sq Ft)
4.1757
5. Family Housing
Adequate Housing Units Maintained ($M/Unit)
0.0536

0.01878

1.0553

0.0123

0.0152

0.0031
0.0073

0.0069
0.0052

-114.06
57.333
29.296
70.314
--20.833
0.5094
0.4162

164.42
73.500
77.000
36.875
0.6891
0.3919

0.0029
0.0085

--

0.9325

--

0.4571
2.6144

---

0.1640
0.3318

43.333

--

--

4.2790

4.6348

4.1735

0.0459

0.0226

0.0219

* Budget request data is a summation of all activities supporting air operations, minus
budgeted amount for flying hours, in support of TAI.

The lowest rate from the four military services for each function represents a
potential level of operational efficiency throughout the DoD. The final analytical step is
benchmarking these lowest rates across the DoD to estimate total budget request
reductions under a functionally-aligned, unified organizational structure. By overlaying
Table 5 and Table 7, estimated budget request savings were calculated. These estimated
budget request savings are displayed in Table 8:
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Table 8: Benchmarked Budget Estimates
Budget Request Estimate ($Million)
USA
USN
USMC
USAF

Functional Area
1. Personnel
Active Duty Officer Personnel ($M)
11148
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel ($M)
26644
Civilian Personnel ($M)
9117
Cadets ($M)
77
PCS Moves ($M)
1521
2. Operations and Maintenance
2.1. Air Operations
Flying Hours ($M)
731
Total Aircraft Inventory* ($M)
589
2.2. Land Operations
Divisions ($M)
21117
Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance ($M)
67
2.3. Space Operations
Supported Satellites in Orbit ($M)
-2.4. Air and Missile Defense Operations
Interceptors/Radars Supported ($M)
115
2.5. ISR Operations
UAVs ($M)
12
2.6. Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support Activities
Total Cost ($M)
9938
2.7. Recruiting and Training
Training Events ($M)
2343
Enlisted Recruits ($M)
185
3. Procurement
3.1. Aircraft
Fighter/Attack Aircraft ($M)
-Rotary Wing Aircraft ($M)
4125
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft ($M)
19
Strategic UAVs ($M)
396
Aircraft Modifications ($M)
987
Repair/Spare Parts & Support ($M)
376
3.2. Land Vehicles
Tactical/Support Vehicles ($M)
506
67

5730
15881
6711
77
924

2368
10478
840
-566

2635
1210

7193
15452
6554
67
840

2925
1592

---

4693
99

---
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--

489

70

--

4

18

1

8997

6298

1464
153

641
133

1485
148

5475
1244
485
125

-622
---

2167
92
67
500
2669
1016

5

--

2029
773
--

3.3. Munitions and Missiles
Air to Ground Munitions ($M)
Tactical Missiles ($M)
3.4. Air and Missile Defense
Interceptors/Radars ($M)
4. Military Construction
Square Feet Maintained ($M)
5. Family Housing
Adequate Housing Units Maintained ($M)
DEPARTMENT TOTALS
DoD TOTAL

-448

46
87

---

558
97

1338

280

--

--

4017

2049

743

2646

217

125

17

582

96033

77864
227339

53442

* Budget request data is a summation of all activities supporting air operations, minus
budgeted amount for flying hours, in support of TAI.

By subtracting the total estimated DoD budget request amount in Table 8 from the
total DoD budget request amount from Table 6, the budget request savings are estimated
at $55 Billion USD for FY 2013. This reduction equates to a 19% reduction in budget
request for those functions analyzed. For ease of comparison, Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 are
consolidated at Appendix C, Consolidated Results for IQ 2.

Sensitivity Analysis

These results assume perfect extrapolation of the lowest operational efficiency
rates across the entire DoD. While this logic holds in theory, in practice, extrapolating
rates across the entire DoD will likely yield a more uncertain outcome. To improve the
fidelity of these results, the budget request savings are estimated by extrapolating the 2nd
lowest rates for each function from Table 7. The result is an operational trade-space that
provides a more accurate estimate of potential budget request savings under the proposed
functionally-aligned structure. Budget request calculations using higher rates are
presented in Appendix D, Sensitivity Analysis for IQ2.
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Using the 2nd lowest rate, budget request savings are estimated at $7 Billion USD
for FY 2013. Working in the opposite direction, if the 19% savings calculated in Table 8
were extrapolated across the entire $526.2 Billion USD DoD budget request for FY 2013,
the estimated savings would be roughly $100 Billion USD. The estimated budget request
savings trade space under the proposed functionally-aligned structure is $7 Billion to
$100 Billion USD for FY 2013. These savings should theoretically apply to every budget
request in future fiscal year in which the proposed structure is implemented.

IQ 3. What are the non-financial implications of a functionally-aligned, unified
structure?

A content analysis of the relevant literature presented in Chapter II provides a list
of potential non-financial benefits to reorganizing the DoD’s current structure. These
espoused benefits stem from various viewpoints on organizational reform. Each potential
benefit was assessed against the backdrop of the proposed DoD organizational structure
presented in Figure 7. Only those potential benefits that may result from this proposed
structure were included in this analysis. The results of this analysis are presented
alphabetically by source in Table 9:

Table 9: Non-Financial Benefits of Proposed DoD Structure
Potential Benefit
Source
Establish a cohesive military culture of shared values
Fautua, 2000: 86
Consistency between training for, and operational
Jones, 1996: 27
execution of, functional missions
Enables joint staff to tackle tough decisions once shrouded Jones, 1996: 27
in service parochialism
Reduces conflicts of interest between senior service leaders Jones, 1996: 27
Improved flexibility and speed of national command
Kaplan, 1993: 15
control
Keskel, 2002: 54
Pagan 14
Removing service departments streamlines PPBES process Kaplan, 1993: 15
Consolidation and reduction of real property footprint
Kaplan, 1993: 16
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More efficient acquisition process – reduce procurement of
redundant and non-interoperable systems
Single personnel system for military and civilians across all
corps
Common regulations, rules, and standards for each function
Roles and mission controversy between service would ease
Maintains current force capabilities without “hollowing”
out force
Corps able to focus on core competencies (teeth) and allow
defense-wide agencies to focus on support functions (tail)
Significant reduction in duplication between services in
operational and support functions
Greater flexibility to the joint force commander to execute
military operations in support of NSS
Increased interoperability through truly joint systems
Increased coordination between corps and between corps
and external agencies
Corps structure allows for a quicker, more comprehensive
response as new missions emerge (i.e. possible
establishment of a Cyber Corps)
Allows for broader organizational concepts for national
security
Reduction in staff duplication streamlines the organization
allowing for better management
Improved strategic vision across DoD

Kaplan, 1993: 16
Keskel, 2002: 50
Kaplan, 1993: 17
Kaplan, 1993: 17
Kaplan, 1993: 17
Nunn, 1996: 64
Kaplan, 1993: 26
Keskel, 2002: 49
Keskel, 2002: 49
Keskel, 2002: 49
Quinn, 1993: 163
Keskel, 2002: 50
Martignetti, 2011: 38
Nunn, 1996: 64

Nunn, 1996: 65
Nunn, 1996: 66
Pagan, 2003: 7
Pagan, 2003: 8

The list of potential benefits in Table 9 is certainly not comprehensive, but it
represents many of the non-financial merits of reorganizing the DoD under a unified,
functionally-aligned structure. However, absent implementation of the reengineering
efforts described in the previous chapter, it is difficult to assess which, if any, of these
benefits might actually be realized.

Summary

This chapter implemented the methodology from Chapter III to evaluate the three
investigative questions posed in Chapter I. To answer IQ1, a synopsis of overlapping
functionality between military services, as defined by DoDD 5100.01, was presented in
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Table 4. To answer IQ2, size-of-force and budget data were collected in Tables 5 and 6
respectively. This data was analyzed to determine operational efficiency rates by
function as displayed in Table 7. These rates were then benchmarked across the size-offorce levels from Table 5 to estimate budget request savings under a unified,
functionally-aligned organizational structure as displayed in Table 8. The estimated
budget request savings from this analysis was between $7 Billion and $100 Billion USD
for FY2013. To answer IQ3, a content analysis of relevant literature was conducted.
Potential non-financial benefits of reengineering the DoD’s organizational structure are
displayed in Table 9. The final chapter of this research recommends area for enhanced
analysis and future study before summarizing conclusions.

71

V. Discussion and Conclusions

Overview

The recommendations in this chapter stem from the results and analysis presented
in the previous chapter. Recommendations are divided into three sections. The first
section examines the need for more accurate cost and budget data to improve the fidelity
of this research. The second section addresses potential resistance to the findings of this
research. The third section delineates areas for future research. Finally, conclusions
from this research are presented.

Requirement for Better Data

The data for this research was pulled from DoD and military service budget
request data for FY2013. It is important to clarify that budgets and cost are not
synonymous. Up to this point, discussion has been on budget requests, not costs. The
difference between budgets and costs and the importance of accurate cost and budget data
is now examined.
Budgets are estimated levels of financial resources required to accomplish a
functional activity. Under traditional approaches, current year budgets are typically
produced through negotiation to within a few percentage points of the previous year’s
budget (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998). However, in the absence of accurate cost data, budgets
may be woefully inaccurate.
Costs are the amount of financial resources actually expended to accomplish a
functional activity. According to Cooper & Kaplan, most organizations, operating under
a traditional cost accounting (TCA) system, have little knowledge of what it costs an
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organization to perform its required functions. Under TCA, an organization will allocate
all of its costs via direct labor, equipment, or material costs, completely ignoring indirect
and support costs. The DoD utilizes a TCA approach to allocate overhead costs
throughout its vast hierarchical system. An alternative to TCA is activity-based costing
(ABC) (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998).
ABC assigns direct, indirect, and support costs to the functions that consume
organizational resources. Costs are tied to a particular product, customer, or process
instead of being arbitrarily spread over an entire operation. According to Cooper &
Kaplan, ABC systems seek to answer four fundamental questions:
1. What activities are being performed by the organizational resources?
2. How much does it cost to perform organizational activities and business
processes?
3. Why does the organization need to perform activities and business processes?
4. How much of each activity is required for the organization’s products services
and customers? (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998: 79)
The product of ABC is a much clearer picture for managers and leaders seeking to
understand the “economics of their operations.” (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998: 3) ABC is a
system by which managers can more accurately account for the consumption of financial
resources. According to Cooper & Kaplan, ABC is a necessary predicate to effective and
accurate organizational budgeting through activity-based budgeting (ABB).
ABB is simply ABC in reverse. ABC assigns costs to functions based on the
resources consumed by that function; ABB uses this cost data to estimate the amount of
financial resources needed to operate required functions in the next fiscal period (Cooper
& Kaplan, 1998). Instead of using the budget from the previous fiscal period as the
starting point for the current budget, under ABB, budgets are calculated from scratch
based on the anticipated costs required to perform the required functions of the
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organization. The result is that, under ABB, budget requests and organizational costs are
very closely aligned and every dollar is accurately traced to specific functions.
This research estimates a $7 Billion to $100 Billion USD FY2013 budget
reduction by reengineering the DoD under a unified, functionally-aligned organizational
structure. These results however are based on budget request data derived from TCA
principles. Therefore, the accuracy of this budget request data is questionable. $7 Billion
to $100 Billion USD is a rough order-of-magnitude estimate of potential savings. Before
proceeding with any reengineering efforts, the DoD must accurately assign costs to the
functions it performs. The DoD must be able to articulate the cost to operate an F-22, a
Stryker Brigade, or a Navy Cruiser, it must understand the direct, indirect, and support
costs of organizing, training, and equipping its personnel. Only when these costs are
delineated under an ABC, and subsequently ABB, model, is a more accurate estimate of
potential financial savings possible. Cooper & Kaplan (1998) argue that there are four
fundamental steps to developing an ABC system.
First, an organization must develop an activity dictionary identifying the activities
it performs. An activity is a verb and an associated object, i.e. fly aircraft. This
dictionary describes in aggregate what the organization does. DODD 5100.01 provides
an excellent jumping off point for building a DoD activity dictionary.
Second, an organization must determine the amount of resources spent on each
activity. This is an arduous task for an organization as large as the DoD. However,
delineating how much direct, indirect, and support resources are required to support
activities is imperative to implementing ABC and ABB models and understanding the
economic roadmap of the organization. An important consideration in this step is the
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development of a hierarchy of activities by which costs are assigned at the level where
resources are consumed. Such insight is extremely meaningful in a hierarchicallystructured organization like the DoD.
The third step is to identify the organization’s products, services, or customers.
An organization must be able to articulate why it necessary to perform the activities it
does. According to Cooper & Kaplan, the reason that an organization performs activities
is to “design, build, and deliver products and services to its customer.” (Cooper &
Kaplan, 1998: 94) The military services perform activities to accomplish functional
activities for their customer, the combatant commander. This is the link between ABC
and BPR. Reengineering involves radically changing processes, which are collections of
activities, to provide value to the customer (Hammer & Champy, 1993). The customer
must be the object in focus during both ABC and BPR initiatives.
The final step is to select activity cost drivers that link activity costs to the
organization’s products, services, and customers. Cooper & Kaplan define an activity
cost driver as a “quantitative measure of the output of an activity.” (Cooper & Kaplan,
1998: 95) Cost drivers can be transaction-, duration-, or intensity-based. The activity
hierarchy described in step 2 provides the framework for matching the level of cost to an
associated activity at the same hierarchical level. Unit-level activities should have unitlevel activity drivers; division-level activities should have division-level activity drivers;
etc.
This section provided an elementary overview of ABC and ABB in relation to the
DoD. The brevity of this section is not intended to diminish the importance of its
content. The DoD must have an accurate understanding of which activities consume
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which resources at what level before considering reengineering. Even if the DoD were to
develop an ABC system and leverage that system to implement ABB, there would likely
be resistance to the model proposed by this research. The next section discusses this
potential resistance via a content analysis of literature reviewed in Chapter II.

Resistance to Research

The results in Chapter IV highlight several potential financial and non-financial
benefits of the unified, functionally-aligned organizational structure proposed by this
research. Despite these potential benefits, existing literature suggests considerable
resistance to any major changes to the current DoD organizational structure. Through
content analysis of the literature examined in Chapter II, this section addresses six major
points of potential resistance against adopting the proposed model.
The first point of resistance is one of politics. The Constitution of the United
States, Article One, Section Eight lists the powers enumerated to Congress regarding the
establishment and organization of a military. The US Military serves to uphold
constitutional ideals at the will of Congress. The current DoD organizational structure is
physically, financially, and culturally rooted in all 50 states and most congressional
districts. Communities across the country typically welcome military installations
because of the economic stimulus and social prestige they afford. Congressional infighting to maintain respective slices of the military pie is a reality. The lack of
successful Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) implementation in recent history
highlights the juxtaposition that congressional leaders face between reducing the DoD’s
footprint to realize financial savings and maintaining a position of favor with their
respective electorates.
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The changes proposed by recent BRAC initiatives pale in comparison to the
changes proposed by this research. Reengineering the DoD is likely to be politically
inauspicious. However, it should be noted that this research proposes very few
reductions in personnel, missions, or installations. Instead, this research argues for the
functional reorientation of these personnel, missions, and installations to improve their
operational efficiency.
The second point of resistance regards the history and tradition of the Military
Services. Three of the four US Military Services have histories dating back over 200
years to the very foundations of the United States. These are revered heritages in which
many service members, both past and present, find their very identity. To illustrate this
point, suppose an Army officer, Naval petty officer, Marine sergeant, or Air Force airmen
were asked, “Who do you work for?” Their answers would likely be the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force respectively. While these answers are correct, it is also
valid to say that all four of these individuals work for the DoD or the USG. Most service
members identify with their respective services, not their government, or governmental
department.
The model proposed by this research attempts to unify the US Military and in so
doing, it attempts to dissolve service-centric mentalities and unhealthy service
parochialism. However, the proposed model maintains room for the continuation of
history and tradition under newly designated functional corps. The heritage of individual
units could continue as units are realigned, not eliminated.
A final thought regarding service heritage is one of perspective. The military
services have rich histories and time-honored traditions; but these service histories and
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traditions fall under a much grander umbrella of history and tradition that is the United
States of America. If an alternative DoD organizational structure provides the United
States with financial and operational advantages over the status quo, should not such a
structure be given due consideration?
A third point of resistance is based on the argument that a certain degree of
service parochialism is healthy and beneficial for the wellbeing of the US Military. The
principles of free market economics dictate that competition between firms provides a
better product or service at a better price over monopolistic or socialistic settings. The
argument could be made of competition between the services—through competition with
each other, the military services can better serve combatant commanders and American
citizens.
This logic is flawed however; there is a difference between inter-firm and intrafirm competition. Firms that compete with themselves internally will likely not optimize
their overall performance. If different divisions in a firm seek local optimums at the
expense of the firm’s overall wellbeing, the firm will not perform to its’ potential. If
however, divisions are unified in their effort to maximize the overall performance of the
firm, then, and only then, will the firm optimize its performance. The DoD is a single
government department (firm) and the Military Services (divisions) must be unified in
their efforts to provide the best service to combatant commanders, elected civilian
officials, and American citizens (customers).
The fourth point of resistance concerns the consolidation of civilian control under
the DoD. Currently, the Military Service Secretaries maintain control over their
respective services. Under the proposed model, civilian control would be consolidated
78

with the SECDEF. Does this consolidation erode constitutionally-mandated civilian
control of the military? Further, the current division of power between the military
services provides an internal check and balance for the DoD. Under the proposed model,
this check and balance would be diminished.
While these points are valid, they are perhaps shortsighted. Under the proposed
model, civilian control would still reside with the SECDEF, Congress, and National
Command Authority. Raising the level of civilian control above Service Secretaries does
not diminish the importance of that control; conversely, it emphasizes the need for
civilian control to be overarching with a focus on national defense instead of the defense
of service-centric interests.
A fifth point of resistance is that by consolidating functions under corps,
interoperability of forces might diminish. A lack of interoperability between military
forces has, in the past, caused problems for the DoD (i.e. fratricide during Operation
Provide Comfort). Joint exercises are intended to overcome interoperability challenges.
Under the proposed model, joint exercises would continue to serve this purpose.
However, unlike today, under the proposed model, actions within functional areas would
already be coordinated. For example, all forces aligned under the Air Corps would
already function under a set of standardized doctrine, regulations, and operating
procedures. The challenge of interoperability between functions would remain, but
interoperability challenges within functions would largely disappear.
A final point of resistance is the consolidation of support functions under defensewide agencies and activities. Currently, each Military Service provides forces to
accomplish support functions to sustain the service’s operational mission. Each service’s
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support requirements are uniquely tied to the operational mission of that service. While
there is considerable redundancy across these support functions between services, the
requirements are not universal. Additionally, if support functions were consolidated,
operational commanders would have much less control over the quantity, quality, and
timeliness of those support functions. These are valid concerns. Under the proposed
model, careful consideration would need to be given to which functions are truly tied to
the operational functionality of the corps. Those functions that are truly unique to the
corps’ operational capability should be retained within that corps. All other functions
should be consolidated at the DoD level. To delineate between these two categories, a
DoD-wide, function-by-function, analysis would be required. Such analysis is beyond
the scope of this research.

Areas for Future Research

The scope of this research is vast. Attempting to understand the interrelation of
the history, organization, and budget of the DoD is an enormous undertaking. This
research merely scratches the surface of this immense topic. Therefore, there are several
areas recommended for future research.
First, the proposed methodology could be refined. With more detailed budget
data and more time, future researchers could provide a more detailed comparison of areas
of overlapping functionality between Military Services. Choosing units of comparison at
a sub-aggregate level may improve the accuracy and fidelity of this research.
Second, the proposed methodology could be applied across multiple fiscal years.
FY2013 was selected for this research because it was the most recent fiscal year for
which all required data was available at the time when analysis began. Comparing results
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across fiscal years could yield a more accurate estimate of potential cost savings under a
unified, functionally-aligned DoD organizational structure.
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the accuracy of this research could
be much improved through the utilization of an ABC/ABB system for the DoD. Future
research could use the four steps identified by Cooper & Kaplan (1998) to develop a
comprehensive framework by which the DoD could adapt an ABC/ABB system.
A fourth area for future research would be a Delphi study by senior DoD leaders
to delineate which support functions should reside with their respective functional corps
and which should be consolidated under the purview of the defense-wide agencies and
activities. This study could also cross-examine DODD 5100.01 to determine which
functional areas of the DoD are truly redundant.
Fifth, a small-scale pilot study could be conducted as proof of concept for
proposed methodology. For example, the DoD’s current joint-basing initiatives could be
analyzed using the methodology proposed here within. This analysis would likely yield
very useful information regarding the practical implementation of this research.
Finally, a study of increasing returns to scale could yield additional potential
savings over those identified in this research. According to Richard de Neufville:
Returns to scale reflect the proportionate increase in output when all inputs to the
design change proportionately. (De Neufville, 1990: 52)
As functions are consolidated under their respective corps, additional financial
savings may be realized due to the higher operational efficiency of a larger functional
force operating in a unified manner. This research estimates budget savings based on
benchmarked operating efficiency of current operating efficiencies. Examining the effect

81

of increasing returns to scale may yield higher budget savings based on potential
operating efficiency.

Conclusions

The DoD and the USG face an uncertain fiscal future. While the current DoD
organizational structure affords the United States a world-class military, it does so at a
cost. The functional redundancy of the Military Services and the parochial service
infighting it produces diminishes the operational efficiency of the US Military. Working
towards reengineering the DoD under a unified, functionally-aligned organizational
structure may yield significant financial and non-financial benefits to combatant
commanders and American citizens.
The model proposed by this research attempts to delineate the “tooth” from the
“tail” of the current DoD structure. Under the proposed model, core operational missions
would be realigned under functional corps. All other support functions would be divided
between defense-wide agencies and activities. Finally, civilian control of the military
would be consolidated under the SECDEF with the dissolution of the service secretary
positions.
As redundant functions, which were previously accomplished by the services, are
realigned under functional corps, benchmarked operational efficiency rates between the
services by function yields a baseline estimate for financial savings. The potential budget
request reduction for FY2013 under this proposed model is estimated to be between $7
Billion and $100 Billion USD.
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The non-financial benefits of the proposed model are numerous and varied. As
summarized in Table 9, these benefits focus on the improved interoperability of military
forces and resulting increased operational efficiency.
This research is not intended to be comprehensive. Several thought papers have
been written proposing alternative models to the DoD structure; this research is intended
to provide a quantitative methodology by which to assess the potential fiscal savings of
those alternative structures. Vast areas of future research exist, the implications of which
may result in a fundamental, radically different, reengineering of current and future DoD
operations.
Historic changes to the United States’ military construct have coincided with
times of great change in world politics. The National Security Act of 1947 came on the
heels of the Second World War. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was born in the
dwindling light of the Cold War. Today’s uncertain geopolitical climate and the USG’s
fiscally-unbalanced posture may provide a compulsory backdrop for yet another historic
change to the DoD. My hope is that this research provides meaningful insight towards
positive change.
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Appendix A. Synopsis of DODD 5100.01
(Source: DoDD 5100.01, Enclosure 6, December 21, 2010)

Functions common to all Military
Departments

Functions common to all Military
Services
2.a. Develop concepts, doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures, and organize, train,
equip, and provide land, naval, air, space, and
cyberspace forces, in coordination with the other
Military Services, Combatant Commands, USG
departments and agencies, and international
partners, as required, that enable joint force
commanders to conduct decisive operations across
the spectrum of conflict in order to achieve the
desired end state.

1.a.1. Recruiting.
1.a.2. Organizing.
1.a.3. Supplying.
1.a.4. Equipping (including research and
development).
1.a.5. Training.

2.b. Determine Military Service force
requirements and make recommendations
concerning force requirements to support national
security objectives and strategy and to meet the
operational requirements of the Combatant
Commands.

1.a.6. Servicing.
1.a.7. Mobilizing.
1.a.8. Demobilizing.
1.a.9. Administering (including the morale and
welfare of personnel).

2.c. Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the
assignment and deployment of forces to the
Combatant Commands established by the
President through the Secretary of Defense.

1.a.10. Maintaining.
1.a.11. Construction, outfitting, and repairs of
military equipment.
1.a.12. Construction, maintenance, and repair of
buildings, structures, and utilities as well as the
acquisition, management, and disposal of real
property and natural resources.

2.d. Monitor and assess Military Service
operational readiness and capabilities of forces
for assignment to the Combatant Commands and
plan for the use of the intrinsic capabilities of the
other Military Services and USSOCOM that may
be made available.
2.e. Develop doctrine, tactics, techniques, and
procedures for employment by Military Service
forces and:
2.e.1. Assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in the development of joint doctrine.
2.e.2. Coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the
other Military Services, USG departments and
agencies, partner security forces, and nongovernmental organizations, in the development of
the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures
necessary for participation in and/or command of
joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
2.e.3. Coordinate with the Commander,
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USSOCOM, in the development of the doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by
Military Service forces when related to special
operations.
2.f. Provide for training for joint operations
and joint exercises in support of Combatant
Command operational requirements, including the
development of Military Service joint training
requirements, policies, procedures, and
publications.
2.g. Provide logistical support for Military
Service and all forces assigned to joint commands,
including procurement, distribution, supply,
equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise
directed by the Secretary of Defense.
2.h. Organize, train, and equip forces to
contribute unique service capabilities to the joint
force commander to conduct the following
functions across all domains, including land,
maritime, air, space, and cyberspace:
2.h.1. Intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (ISR), and information
operations, to include electronic warfare and
MISO in order to provide situational awareness
and enable decision superiority across the range of
military operations.
2.h.2. Offensive and defensive cyberspace
operations to achieve cyberspace superiority in
coordination with the other Military Services,
Combatant Commands, and USG departments and
agencies.
2.h.3. Special operations in coordination with
USSOCOM and other Combatant Commands, the
Military Services, and other DoD Components.
2.h.4. Personnel recovery operations in
coordination with USSOCOM and other
Combatant Commands, the Military Services, and
other DoD Components.
2.h.5. Counter weapons of mass destruction.
2.h.6. Building partnership capacity/security
force assistance operations.
2.h.7. Forcible entry operations.
2.h.8. Missile Defense.
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2.h.9. Other functions as assigned, such as
Presidential support and antiterrorism.
2.i. Organize, train, and equip forces to
conduct support to civil authorities in the
United States and abroad, to include support for
disaster relief, consequence management, mass
migration, disease eradication, law enforcement,
counter-narcotics, critical infrastructure protection,
and response to terrorist attack, in coordination
with the other Military Services, Combatant
Commands, National Guard, and USG
departments and agencies.
2.j. Operate organic land vehicles, aircraft,
cyber assets, spacecraft or space systems, and
ships or craft.
2.k. Conduct operational testing and
evaluation.
2.l. Provide command and control.
2.m.

Provide force protection.

2.n. Consult and coordinate with the other
Military Services on all matters of joint
concern.

Functions of the Department Functions of the Department
of the Army
of the Navy
4.a. The Department of the Army
includes land combat, and service
forces, and such aviation, water
transport, and space and cyberspace
forces as may be organic therein,
and shall be organized, trained, and
equipped primarily for prompt and
sustained combat incident to
operations on land, and to support
the other Military Services and joint
forces. The Army is responsible for
the preparation of land forces
necessary for the effective
prosecution of war and military
operations short of war, except as
otherwise assigned. The Army is
the Nation’s principal land force
and promotes national values and
interests by conducting military
engagement and security
cooperation; deterring aggression

5.a. The Department of the Navy
is composed of naval, land, air,
space, and cyberspace forces, both
combat and support, not otherwise
assigned, to include those organic
forces and capabilities necessary to
operate, and support the Navy and
Marine Corps, the other Military
Services, and joint forces. The Navy
and Marine Corps comprise the
Nation’s principal maritime force.
They employ the global reach,
persistent presence through forwardstationed and rotationally-based
forces, and operational flexibility to
secure the Nation from direct attack;
secure strategic access and retain
global freedom of action; strengthen
existing and emerging alliances and
partnerships; establish favorable
security conditions; deter aggression
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Functions of The
Department of the
Air Force
6.a. The Department of
the Air Force is composed
of air, space, and
cyberspace forces, both
combat and support, not
otherwise assigned. The
Air Force is the Nation’s
principal air and space
force, and is responsible
for the preparation of forces
necessary for the effective
prosecution of war. The
Department of the Air
Force shall organize, train,
equip, and provide air,
space, and cyberspace
forces for the conduct of
prompt and sustained
combat operations, military
engagement, and security
cooperation in defense of

and violence; and should deterrence
fail, compelling enemy behavioral
change or compliance. The Army
shall contribute forces through a
rotational, cyclical readiness model
that provides a predictable and
sustainable supply of modular forces
to the Combatant Commands, and a
surge capacity for unexpected
contingencies.

and violence by state, non-state, and
individual actors and, should
deterrence fail, prosecute the full
range of military operations in
support of U.S. national interests.
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the Nation, and to support
the other Military Services
and joint forces. The Air
Force will provide the
Nation with global
vigilance, global reach, and
global power in the form of
in-place, forward-based,
and expeditionary forces
possessing the capacity to
deter aggression and
violence by state, non-state,
and individual actors to
prevent conflict, and,
should deterrence fail,
prosecute the full range of
military operations in
support of U.S. national
interests.

Functions of the
Army

Functions of the
Navy

Functions of the
Marine Corps

Land Operations
4.b.1. Conduct prompt
and sustained combined
arms combat
operations on land in
all environments and
types of terrain,
including complex
urban environments, in
order to defeat enemy
ground forces, and
seize, occupy, and
defend land areas.

5.c.3. Conduct land
and air operations
essential to the
prosecution of a naval
campaign or as directed.

5.b.1. Conduct
offensive and defensive
operations associated
with the maritime
domain including
achieving and
maintaining sea control,
to include subsurface,
surface, land, air, space,
and cyberspace.

5.c.4. Conduct
complex expeditionary
operations in the urban
littorals and other
challenging
environments.

4.b.7. Interdict enemy
sea, space, air power,
and communications
through operations on
or from the land.
4.b.13. Operate land
lines of
communication.
Maritime Operations
5.c.1. Seize and
defend advanced naval
bases or lodgments to
facilitate subsequent
joint operations.

5.b.1. Conduct
offensive and defensive
operations associated
with the maritime
domain including
achieving and
maintaining sea control,
to include subsurface,
surface, land, air, space,
and cyberspace.

5.c.4. Conduct
complex expeditionary
operations in the urban
littorals and other
challenging
environments.

5.b.2. Provide power
projection through
sea-based global strike,
to include nuclear and
conventional
capabilities; interdiction
and interception
capabilities; maritime
and/or littoral fires, to
include naval surface
fires; and close air
support for ground
forces.

5.c.5. Conduct
amphibious
operations, including
engagement, crisis
response, and power
projection operations to
assure access. The
Marine Corps has
primary responsibility
for the development of
amphibious doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and
equipment.

5.b.6. Establish,
maintain, and defend
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Functions of the
Air Force

sea bases in support of
naval, amphibious, land,
air, or other joint
operations as directed.
Air Operations
5.c.3. Conduct land
and air operations
essential to the
prosecution of a naval
campaign or as directed.

5.b.1. Conduct
offensive and defensive
operations associated
with the maritime
domain including
achieving and
maintaining sea control,
to include subsurface,
surface, land, air, space,
and cyberspace.

5.c.2. Provide close
air support for ground
forces.

5.b.2. Provide power
projection through seabased global strike, to
include nuclear and
conventional
capabilities; interdiction
and interception
capabilities; maritime
and/or littoral fires, to
include naval surface
fires; and close air
support for ground
forces.

6.b.2. Conduct
offensive and defensive
operations, to include
appropriate air and
missile defense, to gain
and maintain air
superiority, and air
supremacy as required,
to enable, the conduct of
operations by U.S. and
allied land, sea, air,
space, and special
operations forces.
6.b.3. Conduct global
precision attack, to
include strategic
attack, interdiction,
close air support, and
prompt global strike.
6.b.6. Provide rapid
global mobility to
employ and sustain
organic air and space
forces and other
Military Service and
USSOCOM forces, as
directed, to include
airlift forces for
airborne operations,
air logistical support,
tanker forces for inflight refueling, and
assets for aeromedical
evacuation.
6.b.9. Conduct global
integrated command and
control for air and space
operations.

Nuclear Operations
5.b.9. Conduct
nuclear operations in
support of strategic
deterrence, to include
providing and
maintaining nuclear

6.b.1. Conduct
nuclear operations in
support of strategic
deterrence, to include
providing and
maintaining nuclear
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surety and capabilities.

surety and capabilities.
5.b.2. Provide power
projection through seabased global strike, to
include nuclear and
conventional
capabilities; interdiction
and interception
capabilities; maritime
and/or littoral fires, to
include naval surface
fires; and close air
support for ground
forces.
Air and Missile Defense Operations
4.b.2. Conduct air
and missile defense to
support joint campaigns
and assist in achieving
air superiority.

5.b.3. Conduct
ballistic missile
defense.

6.b.2. Conduct
offensive and defensive
operations, to include
appropriate air and
missile defense, to gain
and maintain air
superiority, and air
supremacy as required,
to enable, the conduct of
operations by U.S. and
allied land, sea, air,
space, and special
operations forces.

Riverine Operations
4.b.5. Conduct
riverine operations.

5.b.5. Conduct
riverine operations.

5.c.4. Conduct
complex expeditionary
operations in the urban
littorals and other
challenging
environments.

5.c.5. Conduct
amphibious
operations, including
engagement, crisis
response, and power
projection operations to
assure access. The
Marine Corps has
primary responsibility
for the development of
amphibious doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and
equipment.
Space Operations
4.b.9. Provide

5.b.8. Provide

6.b.5.
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Conduct

support for space
operations to enhance
joint campaigns, in
coordination with the
other Military Services,
Combatant Commands,
and USG departments
and agencies.

support for joint space
operations to enhance
naval operations, in
coordination with the
other Military Services,
Combatant Commands,
and USG departments
and agencies.

offensive and defensive
operations to gain and
maintain space
superiority to enable
the conduct of
operations by U.S. and
allied land, sea, air,
space, and cyberspace
forces. Conduct space
operations to enhance
joint campaigns, in
coordination with the
other Military Services,
Combatant Commands,
and USG departments
and agencies.
6.b.9. Conduct global
integrated command and
control for air and space
operations.

Airborne Operations
6.b.6. Provide rapid
global mobility to
employ and sustain
organic air and space
forces and other
Military Service and
USSOCOM forces, as
directed, to include
airlift forces for
airborne operations,
air logistical support,
tanker forces for inflight refueling, and
assets for aeromedical
evacuation.

4.b.3. Conduct
airborne and air
assault, and
amphibious
operations. The Army
has primary
responsibility for the
development of airborne
doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and
equipment.

ISR Operations
4.b.12. Conduct
reconnaissance,
surveillance, and
target acquisition.

6.b.4. Provide timely,
global integrated ISR
capability and capacity
from forward deployed
locations and globally
distributed centers to
support world-wide
operations.
Logistics Operations

4.b.8. Provide
logistics to joint
operations and
campaigns, including
joint over-the-shore and

5.b.7. Provide naval
expeditionary logistics
to enhance the
deployment,
sustainment, and

6.b.7. Provide agile
combat support to
enhance the air and
space campaign and the
deployment,
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intra-theater transport of
time-sensitive, missioncritical personnel and
materiel.

employment,
sustainment, and
redeployment of air and
space forces and other
forces operating within
the air and space
domains, to include joint
air and space bases, and
for the Armed Forces
other than which is
organic to the individual
Military Services and
USSOCOM in
coordination with the
other Military Services,
Combatant Commands,
and USG departments
and agencies.

redeployment of naval
forces and other forces
operating within the
maritime domain, to
include joint sea bases,
and provide sea
transport for the Armed
Forces other than that
which is organic to the
individual Military
Services and
USSOCOM.

6.b.6. Provide rapid
global mobility to
employ and sustain
organic air and space
forces and other
Military Service and
USSOCOM forces, as
directed, to include
airlift forces for airborne
operations, air logistical
support, tanker forces
for in-flight refueling,
and assets for
aeromedical evacuation.
Civil Affairs Operations
4.b.4 Conduct civil
affairs operations.
Aeromedical Evacuation Operations
4.b.11. Provide intratheater aeromedical
evacuation.

6.b.6. Provide rapid
global mobility to
employ and sustain
organic air and space
forces and other
Military Service and
USSOCOM forces, as
directed, to include
airlift forces for airborne
operations, air logistical
support, tanker forces
for in-flight refueling,
and assets for
aeromedical
evacuation.
Establish Initial Military Government
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4.b.6. Occupy
territories abroad and
provide for the initial
establishment of a
military government
pending transfer of this
responsibility to other
authority.

4.b.10. Conduct
authorized civil works
programs, to include
projects for
improvement of
navigation, flood
control, beach erosion
control, and other water
resource developments
in the United States, its
territories, and its
possessions, and
conduct other civil
activities prescribed by
law.

5.c.6. Conduct
security and stability
operations and assist
with the initial
establishment of a
military government
pending transfer of this
responsibility to other
authority.
Civil Works Programs
5.b.4. Conduct ocean,
hydro, and river
survey and
reconstruction.

Security Operations
5.c.7. Provide security
detachments and units
for service on armed
vessels of the Navy,
provide protection of
naval property at naval
stations and bases,
provide security at
designated U.S.
embassies and
consulates, and perform
other such duties as the
President or the
Secretary of Defense
may direct. These
additional duties may
not detract from or
interfere with the
operations for which the
Marine Corps is
primarily organized.
Personnel Recovery Operations
6.b.8. Conduct global
personnel recovery
operations including
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theater-wide combat and
civil search and rescue,
in coordination with the
other Military Services,
USJFCOM,
USSOCOM, and DoD
Components.
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Appendix B. DoD Defense Agencies

Defense Agency
Defense Advanced
Research Projects
Agency

Defense
Commissary
Agency

Defense Contract
Audit Agency

Defense Contract
Management
Agency

Defense Finance
and Accounting
Service

Defense Agencies
Functional Mission
Serves as the research and development
(R&D) organization in DoD with a
primary responsibility of maintaining
U.S. technological superiority over our
adversaries.
Provide an efficient and effective
worldwide system of commissaries for
the resale of groceries and related
household items at reduced prices to
members of the uniformed services,
retired members, dependents of such
members, and other authorized patrons,
to enhance their quality of life and to
support military readiness, recruitment,
and retention.
Perform all necessary contract audits for
the Department of Defense and provide
accounting and financial advisory
services regarding contracts and
subcontracts to all DoD Components
responsible for procurement and contract
administration. These services shall be
provided in connection with negotiation,
administration, and settlement of
contracts and subcontracts to ensure
taxpayer dollars are spent on fair and
reasonable contract prices. DCAA shall
provide contract audit services to other
Federal agencies, as appropriate.
Perform Contract Administration
Services (CAS) and Contingency
Contract Administration Services
(CCAS) for the DoD, other authorized
Federal agencies, foreign governments,
international organizations, and others as
authorized.
To provide finance and accounting
services and monitoring compliance with
all statutory and regulatory requirements
within its functional area. It also includes
the consolidation, standardization, and
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Reference
U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5134.10

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.55

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.36

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.64

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5118.05

Defense
Information
Systems Agency

Defense
Intelligence
Agency

integration of finance and accounting
requirements, functions, procedures, and
DFAS-assigned information systems
within the DoD, while ensuring their
proper relationship with other DoD
functional areas such as budget,
personnel, logistics, and acquisition. The
DFAS shall direct, approve, and perform
finance and accounting activities for the
DoD, to include coordination and
collaboration with all Defense Agencies,
Military Departments, and Combatant
Commands. Fulfilling this mission
enables the DoD to execute a world-class
business operation; deliver accurate,
timely, and relevant financial
information; and employ enhanced
technological capabilities to provide
critical finance and accounting services
to DoD customers and stakeholders.
Responsible for planning, engineering,
acquiring, testing, fielding, and
supporting global net-centric information
and communications solutions to serve
the needs of the President, the Vice
President, the Secretary of Defense, and
the DoD Components, under all
conditions of peace and war.
Satisfy the military and military-related
intelligence requirements of the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the DNI, and provide the military
intelligence contribution to national
foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence. DIA shall plan,
manage, and execute intelligence
operations during peacetime, crisis, and
war. DIA shall serve as the DoD lead for
coordinating intelligence support to meet
COCOM requirements; lead efforts to
align analysis, collection, and
Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) activities with all
operations; and link and synchronize
Military, Defense, and National
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U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.19

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.21

Defense Legal
Services Agency

Defense Logistics
Agency

Defense Security
Cooperation
Agency

Defense Security
Service

Intelligence capabilities.
Provide legal advice, services, and support
to the Defense Agencies, DoD Field
Activities, and, as assigned, other
organizational entities within the DoD;
administer the DoD Standards of Conduct
Program; support and assist the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs (ASD(LA)) in developing the DoD
Legislative Program; oversee DoD
personnel security processes as authorized
by DoDD 5145.3 (Reference (d)) and in
accordance with applicable issuances,
including DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5220.22
(Reference (e), DoDD 5200.02 (Reference
(f)) and DoD 5200.2-R (Reference (g));
and provide fair and impartial
administrative procedures through the
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA).
Function as an integral element of the
military logistics system of the
Department of Defense to provide
effective and efficient worldwide
logistics support to the Military
Departments and the Combatant
Commands under conditions of peace
and war, as well as to
other DoD Components and Federal
agencies, and, when authorized by law,
State and local
government organizations, foreign
governments, and international
organizations.
Directs, administers, and provides DoDwide guidance to the DoD Components and
DoD representatives to U.S. missions
abroad for the execution of DoD security
assistance and security cooperation
programs over which DSCA has
responsibility.
Manage and administer the DoD portion of
the National Industrial Security Program
(NISP) for the DoD Components and, by
mutual agreement, other U.S. Government
(USG) departments and agencies; provide
security education and training products
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U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5145.04

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.22

U.S.
Department
of Defense
Directive
DoDD
5105.65
U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.42

Defense Threat
Reduction Agency

Missile Defense
Agency

National

and services; administer the industrial
portion of the DoD Personnel Security
Program (PSP), except for those cases that
DSS refers to the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA); provide
authorized counterintelligence (CI)
services; and manage and operate the
associated program-specific information
technology (IT) systems. The DSS shall
also support DoD efforts to improve
security programs and processes.
Safeguard the United States and its allies
from weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) threats globally. DTRA has a
unique role in DoD efforts regarding
countering weapons of mass destruction
(CWMD), and supports a broad range of
activities across the CWMD mission.
DTRA provides integrated technical and
operational solutions, as well as
intellectual capital, to inform and support
both DoD and national-level policies and
strategies to address WMD threats to the
homeland as well as to the warfighter. As
such, DTRA supports the CWMD
activities of the U.S. Government (USG)
and its allies at the nexus between WMD
and terrorism.
Manage, direct, and execute the
development of the BMDS in accordance
with National Security Presidential
Directive 23 (Reference (h)) and to
achieve DoD priorities to:
a. Defend the United States, deployed
forces, allies, and friends from ballistic
missile attacks of all ranges in all phases
of flight.
b. Develop and deploy, as directed, a
layered BMDS.
c. Enable the fielding of elements of the
BMDS as soon as practicable.
d. Provide capability in blocks,
improving the effectiveness of fielded
capability by inserting new technologies
as they become available.
Support U.S. national security objectives
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U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.62

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5134.09

U.S. Department of

GeospatialIntelligence
Agency

National
Reconnaissance
Office

National Security
Agency/Central
Security Service

by providing timely,
relevant, and accurate geospatial
intelligence (GEOINT) to the Department
of Defense, the
Intelligence Community (IC), and other
U.S. Government (USG) departments and
agencies;
conducting other intelligence-related
activities essential for U.S. national
security; providing
GEOINT for safety of navigation
information; preparing and distributing
maps, charts, books,
and geodetic products; designing,
developing, operating, and maintaining
systems related to the
processing and dissemination of
GEOINT; and providing GEOINT in
support of the combat objectives of the
Armed Forces of the United States.
Responsible for research and development
(R&D), acquisition, launch, deployment,
and operation of overhead reconnaissance
systems, and related data-processing
facilities to collect intelligence and
information to support national and DoD
missions and other United States
Government (USG) needs.
U.S. Government (USG) lead for
cryptology, and its mission encompasses
both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and
Information Assurance (IA) activities.
The Central Security Service (CSS)
conducts SIGINT collection, processing,
analysis, production, and dissemination,
and other cryptologic operations as
assigned by the Director, NSA/Chief,
CSS (DIRNSA/CHCSS). NSA/CSS
provides SIGINT and IA guidance and
assistance to the DoD Components, as
well as national customers, pursuant to
References (d) and (e). The
DIRNSA/CHCSS serves as the principal
SIGINT and IA advisor to the Secretary
of Defense, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the
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Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.60

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.23

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5100.20

Pentagon Force
Protection Agency

Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Information
Integration/DoD Chief Information
Officer (ASD(NII)/DoD CIO), the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries
of the Military Departments, and the
DNI, as well as other USG officials with
regard to these missions and the
responsibilities enumerated herein.
Provide force protection, security, and
law enforcement to safeguard
personnel, facilities, infrastructure, and
other resources for the Pentagon
Reservation and for assigned DoD
activities and DoD-occupied facilities
within the National Capital Region
(NCR) (hereafter referred to as the
“Pentagon Facilities”). This includes
addressing the full spectrum of threats by
utilizing a balanced strategy of
comprehensive protective intelligence
analysis, prevention, preparedness,
detection, all-hazards response, DoD
crisis management, and support to the
lead emergency management agency.
PFPA will be the DoD focal point for
collaboration and coordination with other
DoD Components, other Executive
Departments and Agencies, and State and
local authorities on matters involving
force protection, security, and law
enforcement activities that impact the
Pentagon Facilities. PFPA will also
provide comprehensive threat
assessments, security, and protection
services for OSD personnel and other
DoD persons, as assigned.
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U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.68

Field Activity
Defense Media
Activity

Defense
POW/Missing

DoD Field Activities
Functional Mission
3.1. Provide a wide variety of information
products to the entire DoD family (Active,
Guard, and Reserve Military Service
members, dependents, retirees, DoD
civilians, and contract employees) and
external audiences through all available
media, including: motion and still imagery;
print; radio; television; Web and related
emerging Internet, mobile, and other
communication technologies.
3.2. Communicate messages and themes
from senior DoD leaders (Secretary of
Defense, Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Military Service Chiefs of Staff,
Combatant Commanders), as well as other
leaders in the chain-of-command, in order
to support and improve quality of life and
morale, promote situational awareness,
provide timely and immediate force
protection information, and sustain
readiness.
3.3. Provide U.S. radio and television
news, information, and entertainment
programming to Active, Guard, and
Reserve Military Service members, DoD
civilians and contract employees, and their
families overseas, on board Navy and
Coast Guard ships, and other authorized
users.
3.4. Provide, throughout the Department of
Defense and to the American public, high
quality visual information products,
including Combat Camera imagery
depicting U.S. military activities and
operations.
3.5. Provide joint education and training
for military and civilian personnel in the
public affairs, broadcasting, and visual
information career fields to meet DoDwide entry level skills and long-term career
development requirements.
Leads the national effort to account for
personnel, including members of the Armed
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Reference
U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.74

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive

Personnel Office

Defense Technical
Information Center

Defense
Technology
Security
Administration

DoD Education
Activity

DoD Human
Resources Activity

Forces on active duty, DoD civilian
employees, or employees of a DoD
contractor, missing as a result of hostile
action, and establishes the conditions
necessary to recover those who become
isolated during operations.
Central scientific, research, and engineering
information support activity for the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (ASD(R&E)) in facilitating his
or her duties, in accordance with DoDD
5134.3 (Reference (c)), and executing the
programs and functions of the DoD Scientific
and Technical Information Program (STIP),
as specified in DoDD 3200.12 and DoD
Instruction (DoDI) 3200.14 (References (d)
and (e)).
Administer, consistent with U.S. policy,
national security objectives, and Federal
laws and regulations, the development and
implementation of DoD technology
security policies on international transfers
of defense-related goods, services, and
technologies to ensure that critical U.S.
military technological advantages are
preserved; transfers that could prove
detrimental to U.S. security interests are
controlled and limited; proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery is prevented; diversion
of defense-related goods to terrorists is
prevented; legitimate defense cooperation
with foreign friends and allies is supported;
and the health of the defense industrial
base is assured.
The mission of DoDEA is to provide an
exemplary education by effectively and
efficiently planning, directing, and
overseeing the management, operation, and
administration of the DoD Domestic
Dependent Elementary and Secondary
Schools (DDESS) and the DoD
Dependents Schools (DoDDS), which
provide instruction from preschool through
grade 12 to eligible dependents.
Enhances the operational effectiveness and
efficiency of diverse programs supporting
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DoDD 5110.10

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.73

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.72

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 1342.20

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive

DoD Test
Resource
Management
Center

Office of
Economic
Adjustment

TRICARE
Management
Activity

the Department of Defense. DoDHRA
combines centralized management of
operations and administrative oversight
with decentralized program guidance. It
supports policy development, develops
products and services that promote and
sustain a high performing workforce,
performs research and analysis, supports
readiness and departmental reengineering
efforts, manages personnel data
repositories, prepares future civilian leaders
through developmental programs, supports
recruiting and retention, and delivers both
benefits and critical services to warfighters
and their families. DoDHRA administers
sexual assault prevention policies and
programs, assists in establishing and
administering language capabilities
policies, and oversees central management
of commercial travel.
Plan for and assess the adequacy of the
Major Range and Test Facility Base
(MRTFB), as defined by section 196 of
reference (a) and, as described in DoD
Directive 3200.11 (reference (b)), to
provide adequate testing in support of
development, acquisition, fielding, and
sustainment of defense systems; and,
maintain awareness of other T&E facilities
and resources, within and outside the
Department, and their impacts on DoD
requirements.
Provide assistance to communities, regions,
and States adversely impacted by
significant defense program changes
including base closures, realignments, or
expansions; defense industry cutbacks;
encroachment; and personnel reductions or
increases.
4.1. Manage TRICARE;
4.2. Manage and execute the Defense
Health Program (DHP) Appropriation and
the
DoD Unified Medical Program; and
4.3. Support the Uniformed Services in
implementation of the TRICARE Program
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DoDD 5100.87

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5105.71

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 3030.01

U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5136.12

Washington
Headquarters
Services

and the Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS).
Provide a broad range of administrative,
management, and common support services,
including human resources and security
clearance services, facilities and facility
operations, information technology (IT)
capabilities and services, financial
management, acquisition and contracting,
and secure communications. It also provides
oversight of designated DoD-wide statutory
and regulatory programs, supporting DoD
Components and other federal entities as
directed and assigned. WHS operates and
maintains the Pentagon Reservation and
designated facilities in the National Capital
Region (NCR).
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U.S. Department of
Defense Directive
DoDD 5110.04

Size of Force (#)
Table 5

Budget Request
Amount ($Million)
Table 6

Rate ($Million/Unit of
Function)
Table 7

Budget Request
Estimate ($Million)
Table 8

Estimated Savings
($Million)

Appendix C. Consolidated Results for IQ 2 (Using Lowest Rates)

99800
51300
21200
64400

11148
8006
2866
9131

0.1117
0.1561
0.1352
0.1418

11148
5730
2368
7193

447800
266900
176100
259700

27276
18840
10478
17822

0.0609
0.0706
0.0595
0.0686

26644
15881
10478
15452

255900
188500
23600
184100

9117
8140
1658
8360

0.0356
0.0432
0.0703
0.0454

9117
6711
840
6554

4500
4500
0
3900

78
77
0
70

0.0173
0.0171
0
0.0179

77
77
0
67

266800
162100
99900
147300

1787
1031
566
1290

0.0067
0.0064
0.0057
0.0088

1521
924
566
840

TOTAL
2. Operations and Maintenance
2.1. Air Operations
293000
731

0
2276
498
1938
4712
632
2959
0
2370
5961
0
1429
818
1806
4053
1
0
0
3
4
266
107
0
450
823

0.0025

731

1. Personnel
Active Duty Officer Personnel

TOTAL
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel

TOTAL
Civilian Personnel

TOTAL
Cadets

TOTAL
PCS Moves

Flying Hours

105

0

105400

6053

0.0057

2635

117000

4778

0.0041

2925

1853
5271

1938

589

0.3039

589

0

3983

3499

0.8785

1210

5239

10773

2.0563

1592

9181
11470

1173.3
-1337.0
--

21117
-4693
--

0

TOTAL
Total Aircraft Inventory*

TOTAL
2.2. Land Operations
18
21117
--Divisions
4
5348
--TOTAL
111
84
--Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance
165
99
--TOTAL
2.3. Space Operations
--9
239
Supported Satellites in Orbit
--62
489
TOTAL
2.4. Air and Missile Defense Operations
220
115
134
86
Interceptors/Radars Supported
--8
59
TOTAL
2.5. ISR Operations
2115
12
UAVs

Total Cost

2289

655
655

0.7568
-0.6000
--

67
-99
--

17
0
17

-26.555
-7.887

-71
-489

0.5227
0.6418
-7.3750

115
70
-4

0
16

0.0057

12

0

168
0
168

55
71

3194

60

0.01878

18

235

248

1.0553

1

247
289

9938

3096

TOTAL
2.6. Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support Activities
808000
13034
0.0161
106

3418

42

Total Training Population

Enlisted Recruits

732000

8997

0.0123

8997

0

512000

7810

0.0152

6298

1512
4608

0.0051
0.0029
0.0031
0.0069

2343
1464
641
1485

1795
0
48
2036
3879

0.0163
0.0085
0.0073
0.0052

185
153
133
148

396
103
54
0
553

0
0

TOTAL
2.7. Recruiting and Training
808000
4138
511000
1464
221000
689
512000
3521
TOTAL
35600
581
29500
256
25500
187
28400
148
TOTAL
2. Procurement
3.1. Aircraft

Fighter/Attack Aircraft

0
48
0
19

0
5475
0
3124

0
114.06
0
164.42

0
5475
0
2167

179
54
27
4

4125
3096
791
294

23.045
57.333
29.296
73.500

4125
1244
622
92

2
51
0
7

19
3586
0
539

9.500
70.314
0
77.000

19
485
0
67

19
6
0
24

534
125
0
885

28.105
10.833
0
36.875

396
125
0
500

1938

1277

0.6588

987

957
957
0
1852
169
202
2223
0
3101
0
472
3573
138
0
0
385
523
290

3983

2029

0.5094

2029

0

TOTAL
Rotary Wing Aircraft

TOTAL
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft

TOTAL
Strategic UAVs

TOTAL
Aircraft Modifications (TAI)

107

5239

3610

0.6891

2669

1938

376

0.1940

376

941
1231
0

3983

1658

0.4162

773

885

5239

2053

0.3919

1016

1037
1922

0.1321
-0.9325
--

506
-5
--

0

TOTAL
Repair/Spare Parts & Support (TAI)

Tactical/Support Vehicles

Air to Ground Munitions

Tactical Missiles

Interceptors/Radars

Square Feet Maintained

TOTAL
3.2. Land Vehicles
3831
506
--40
37
--TOTAL
3.3. Munitions and Missiles
--280
128
--3403
558
TOTAL
2008
448
389
1017
--434
144
TOTAL
3.4. Air and Missile Defense
43
1338
9
390
----TOTAL
4. Military Construction
962
4017
491
2101
178
825
634
2646
TOTAL

32
32

-0.4571
-0.1640

-46
-558

0.2231
2.6144
-0.3318

448
87
-97

0
930

31.116
43.333
---

1338
280
---

0
110

82
0
82

47
977

110
4.1757
4.2790
4.6348
4.1735

4017
2049
743
2646

0
52
82
0
134

0.0536
0.0459
0.0226

217
125
17

313
138
1

5. Family Housing
9888
5726
798

Adequate Housing Units Maintained

108

530
263
18

26556

582

0.0219

582
TOTAL

TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS
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0
452
55211

Size of Force (#)
Table 5

Budget Request
Amount ($Million)
Table 6

Rate ($Million/Unit of
Function)
Table 7

Budget Request
Estimate ($Million)
Table 8

Estimated Savings
($Million)

Appendix D. Sensitivity Analysis for IQ 2
(Benchmarked Budget Estimates using 2nd Lowest Rates from Table 7.)

99800
51300
21200
64400

11148
8006
2866
9131

0.1117
0.1561
0.1352
0.1418

13493
6936
2866
8707

447800
266900
176100
259700

27276
18840
10478
17822

0.0609
0.0706
0.0595
0.0686

27276
16254
10724
15816

255900
188500
23600
184100

9117
8140
1658
8360

0.0356
0.0432
0.0703
0.0454

11055
8140
1020
7953

4500
4500
0
3900

78
77
0
70

0.0173
0.0171
0
0.0179

78
78
0
67

266800
162100
99900
147300

1787
1031
566
1290

0.0067
0.0064
0.0057
0.0088

1708
1031
639
943

TOTAL
2. Operations and Maintenance
2.1. Air Operations
293000
731

+2345
1070
0
424
+851
0
2586
+246
2006
4346
+1938
0
638
407
+893
0
+1
0
3
2
79
0
+73
347
353

0.0025

1201

1. Personnel
Active Duty Officer Personnel

TOTAL
Active Duty Enlisted Personnel

TOTAL
Civilian Personnel

TOTAL
Cadets

TOTAL
PCS Moves

Flying Hours

110

+470

1054000

6053

0.0057

4321

1170000

4778

0.0041

4778

0
1262

1938

589

0.3039

1703

+1114

3983

3499

0.8785

3499

5239

10773

2.0563

4602

6171
7346

1173.3
-1337.0
--

24066
-5348
--

+2949

TOTAL
Total Aircraft Inventory*

TOTAL
2.2. Land Operations
18
21117
--Divisions
4
5348
--TOTAL
111
84
--Combat Vehicle Depot Maintenance
165
99
--TOTAL
2.3. Space Operations
--9
239
Supported Satellites in Orbit
--62
489
TOTAL
2.4. Air and Missile Defense Operations
220
115
134
86
Interceptors/Radars Supported
--8
59
TOTAL
2.5. ISR Operations
2115
12
UAVs

Total Cost

2289

0
+2949

0.7568
-0.6000
--

84
-125
--

0
+26
+26

-26.555
-7.887

-239
-1646

0.5227
0.6418
-7.3750

141
86
-5

+26
0

0.0057

40

+28

0
+1157
+1157

54
28

3194

60

0.01878

60

235

248

1.0553

4

244
216

12282

752

TOTAL
2.6. Base Operations Support & Service-wide Support Activities
808000
13034
0.0161
111

1732

0

Total Training Population

Enlisted Recruits

732000

8997

0.0123

11126

+2129

512000

7810

0.0152

7810

0
+1377

0.0051
0.0029
0.0031
0.0069

2505
1584
689
1485

1633
+120
0
1587
3100

0.0163
0.0085
0.0073
0.0052

260
215
187
207

321
41
0
+59
303

TOTAL
2.7. Recruiting and Training
808000
4138
511000
1464
221000
689
512000
3521
TOTAL
35600
581
29500
256
25500
187
28400
148
TOTAL
2. Procurement
3.1. Aircraft

Fighter/Attack Aircraft

-48
-19

-5475
-3124

-114.06
-164.42

-7892
-3124

179
54
27
4

4125
3096
791
294

23.045
57.333
29.296
73.500

5244
1582
791
117

2
51
-7

19
3586
-539

9.500
70.314
-77.000

141
3586
-492

19
6
0
24

534
125
0
885

28.105
10.833
0
36.875

534
169
0
675

1938

1277

0.6588

1277

47
3026
0
+44
0
210
166
0

3983

2029

0.5094

2624

+595

TOTAL
Rotary Wing Aircraft

TOTAL
Tactical Airlift/Support Aircraft

TOTAL
Strategic UAVs

TOTAL

112

+2417
0
+2417
+1119
1514
0
177
572
+122
3101

Aircraft Modifications (TAI)

5239

3610

0.6891

3451

1938

376

0.1940

760

159
+436
+384

3983

1658

0.4162

1561

97

5239

2053

0.3919

2053

0
+287

0.1321
-0.9325
--

3572
-37
--

+3066

TOTAL
Repair/Spare Parts & Support (TAI)

Tactical/Support Vehicles

Air to Ground Munitions

Tactical Missiles

Interceptors/Radars

Square Feet Maintained

TOTAL
3.2. Land Vehicles
3831
506
--40
37
--TOTAL
3.3. Munitions and Missiles
--280
128
--3403
558
TOTAL
2008
448
389
1017
--434
144
TOTAL
3.4. Air and Missile Defense
43
1338
9
390
----TOTAL
4. Military Construction
962
4017
491
2101
178
825
634
2646
TOTAL

0
+3066

-0.4571
-0.1640

-128
-1556

0.2231
2.6144
-0.3318

666
129
-144

+218
888

31.116
43.333
---

1863
390
---

+525
0

0
+998
+998

0
670

+525
4.1757
4.2790
4.6348
4.1735

4017
2050
743
2647

0
51
82
+1
132

0.0536
0.0459
0.0226

223
129
18

307
134
0

5. Family Housing
9888
5726
798

Adequate Housing Units Maintained

113

530
263
18

26556

582

0.0219

600
TOTAL

+18
423

TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS

6963

* Budget request data is a summation of all activities supporting air operations, minus
budgeted amount for flying hours, in support of TAI.
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